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Abstract 
My study is an examination of the political theology 
of seventeenth-century English philosopher John Locke. 
Beginning with his early career in 1660, I trace a course 
of Locke's intellectual development on the theme of 
religious toleration. With particular emphasis on the 
Letter Concerning Toleration, I argue that the evolution of 
Locke's theory was based as much on his sincere theological 
concerns as it was on his (more well-known) secular 
arguments. Approaches to Locke's theory are therefore 
necessarily diminished if they fail to recognize the 
significance of his religious beliefs. 
Turning to the present, I look at some of the ways in 
which Locke's theory has been applied in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, and make the claim that his dual 
emphasis on the importance of finding a moral-centre while 
stressing the difficulty of attaining absolute "truth,u has 
much to offer for our current dilemma of religious 
toleration. 
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Introduction 
My study of Locke is perhaps best termed a political 
theology, as it seeks to situate his philosophy in the 
context of seventeenth-century religious thought, as well 
as speculate as to what implications Locke's political 
theology may have for the present. In what is to follow, I 
will trace a course that outlines some of the major 
developments in the evolution of Locke's theory of 
toleration. My purpose will be to provide a necessary yet 
minimal overview of Locke's personal and philosophical 
development so as to set the stage for my examination of 
the Letter Concerning Toleration and its implications for 
the modern dilemma of religious toleration. Accordingly, 
the chapter breakdown will run as follows: chapter one will 
detail some of the major biographical events in Locke's 
life, including some historical background on religious 
persecution in seventeenth-century England and on the 
continent; chapter two will look at his early Two Tracts on 
Government (1660), the "Essay Concerning Toleration" 
(1667), and the "Critical Notes" on Edward Stillingfleet's 
Mischief of Separation and The Unreasonableness of 
Separation (1680), in order to highlight the trajectory of 
Locke's intellectual development on the road to his mature 
1 
theory; chapter three will propose that Locke's theory of 
toleration cannot be understood apart from his theological 
understanding and will include an analysis of the Letter 
Concerning Toleration; and, finally, chapter four will put 
forward some possible directions for applying Locke's 
political theology to the present. 
Chapter one will serve as a staging ground for my 
examination of the theological implications of Locke's 
theory of toleration. A brief overview of the Letter 
Concerning Toleration will be followed by the requisite 
historical, educational, and political background that 
helped to shape Locke's sensibilities, such as the legacy 
of the English Civil War (1642-48), his time at Oxford 
under Puritan control, and the restoration of Charles II in 
1660, when Locke first began his intellectual career. In 
providing this short historical outline, my purpose will be 
to illustrate how these various influences were to shape 
Locke's early thinking on the question of toleration, and 
later to set him apart from mainstream opinion, often at 
the expense of his own interest and personal safety. In 
this respect, it will be of particular importance to note 
the uniqueness of Locke's intellectual career- namely, 
that of a thinker whose ideas on moral and political 
philosophy were shaped by not only his engagement with 
2 
theoretical questions, but by his active role in the 
political intrigues of his day. His experiences at home and 
abroad helped shape the main principles of his theory of 
toleration, from his complex theological understanding on 
the role of Scripture in politics, to his nuanced position 
on the question of tolerating Catholics and those of other 
faiths. 
The second chapter will provide a more detailed 
analysis of the evolution of Locke's views on toleration, 
starting with his early Two Tracts on Government (1660), 
and followed by the nEssay On Toleration" (1667) and the 
ncritical Notes" on Edward Stillingfleet (1680). The 
purpose of this chapter is to show how Locke understood and 
negotiated the question of toleration throughout his 
intellectual career, and to deconstruct some of the core 
theological and political questions on which the question 
hangs. Drawing on the influence of Thomas Hobbes and 
others, I will demonstrate how Locke's early preference for 
authoritarian government was less the result of religious 
intolerance on his part, and more a reaction to the 
difficult question of how to secure civil peace amidst the 
chaos of sectarian strife. Moreover, in considering Locke's 
earlier work on the question of toleration, we are better 
able to situate and appreciate the complexity of the Letter 
3 
Concerning Toleration. By tracing some of the main factors 
that were to influence Locke's views, such as his 
friendship with Robert Boyle, his trip to Cleves in 1665, 
and his relationship with Lord Anthony Ashley Cooper, a 
clearer picture begins to emerge on the evolution of 
Locke's theory. These influences are important since 
factors such as Locke's realization that absolutism 
suppressed the psychological needs of conscience and his 
view that matters of worship were not 'indifferent' but 
necessary to people's beliefs, show how he struggled to 
reconcile the realities of religious plurality, conflict, 
and the rule of law, with the ever-changing situation 
around him. Furthermore, we are able to see how the 
development of Locke's theory of toleration was an example, 
writ-small, of his lifelong pursuit to unite faith and 
reason, and how it would only be with the Letter that Locke 
would bring these two realms - the theological and the 
practical - neatly together. 
Chapter three will move into the crux of the argument 
by examining the Letter itself, and argue that the moral 
implications of Locke's theory of toleration must be based 
on a firm theological ground. Looking first at materialist 
approaches to Locke's philosophy, such as those put forward 
by Leo Strauss and his epigones, I will demonstrate how 
4 
secular interpretations fail to recognize the significance 
of Lockean toleration by neutralizing both the moral 
authority and the theological foundations that he requires 
for the basis of human equality. Moreover, I will emphasize 
how a theological reading of Locke is necessary in order to 
understand his quest to balance the divide between 
knowledge and values in the construction of a just and 
responsible civil authority. Finally, looking to the Letter 
itself, I will suggest that it is only with a theological 
understanding that Locke's theory of toleration takes on 
universal significance by adding a necessary moral 
dimension that it is otherwise lacking. 
For the fourth and final chapter I will explore some 
of the ways in which Locke's theory of toleration might be 
resuscitated in a post-9/11 world, while pointing to those 
aspects of his theory that require a necessary grain of 
salt. I am less interested in proving the "truth" of 
Locke's theory; my real concern will be to demonstrate how 
the "essence" or intent of his argument (for example, his 
attempt to unite a belief in absolute truth with an 
unyielding insistence on human fallibility that stresses 
the difficulty of ever attaining that truth) offers a 
fitting model for the challenges of the twenty-first 
century. 
s 
Chapter One 
John Locke is perhaps best known as a philosopher, 
economist, political theorist, and founding figure of the 
Enlightenment. What is less celebrated and much less 
understood, perhaps, is his pioneering role in modern 
theories of toleration. In 1689, Locke penned his famous 
tract A Letter Concerning Toleration, in response to 
political developments that had occurred in both England 
and in France. 1 In the Letter, Locke sought to prove his 
claim that toleration was the chief characteristic mark of 
the true church, 2 and denounced those who would promote 
Christianity by the use of force. He argued that the church 
was a voluntary society chosen freely by individuals for 
the purpose of salvation, and maintained that the 
magistrate was in no better position to know the true 
church than anyone else. Locke promoted indulgence for a 
variety of religious communities, except for Catholics, 
whom he believed were outside the state because they 
: Although probably written in 1685, the Letter was not published until 
1689, where it appeared anonymously in Latin. The Letter was written in 
order to combat the increasing intolerance of Catholic monarchs such as 
Louis the XIV of France, who had revoked the Edict of Nantes and denied 
tolerance to Huguenot Protestants. See Kim Ian Parker, The Biblical 
Pclitics of John Locke !Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press), 
2 6 0 
: John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration in The Selected Political 
Writinqs of ,7ohn Locke, Paul Sigmund, ed. (New York: Nort.on, 20rJ5), 
126. All future references to the Letter, will be to this edition. 
6 
offered their allegiance to a foreign power (i.e., the 
Pope), and atheists, who forfeited all claims to morality 
by denying the existence of God. While many of these points 
had been argued before, the Letter had an especially 
significant impact corning, as it did, from one of the most 
powerful philosophers of the seventeenth-century. In the 
next century, Voltaire would claim the Letter to be the 
essence of Locke's politics and relevant to life everywhere 
on earth. 3 Likewise, the American revolutionaries would draw 
inspiration from Locke's work, as when Thomas Jefferson 
paraphrased the Letter in a bill enshrining religious 
freedom in Virginia. 4 
John Locke was born in 1632 at Wrington, Somerset, in 
the west of England, and was given a Calvinist upbringing 
by his father, John Sr., who was a reasonably successful 
attorney. At the age of fifteen, John Jr. was admitted to 
Westminster School on the recommendation of Colonel 
Alexander Popham, a wartime friend of his father. It was 
here at Westminster that Locke was first exposed to 
different religious and political viewpoints, and where he 
began his training in classics and biblical languages, 
3 Cited in ,John Dunn, Locke: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
Univ>?rsity Press, 2003), 43. 
4 See Barbara Arneil, John Locke and America (New York: Oxford University 
Pres5, 1997), 158. 
7 
which provided him with the necessary tools for scriptural 
exegesis and theological commentary. In 1652, at the age of 
twenty, Locke entered Christ Church, Oxford, where he was 
exposed to the political and religious tensions that would 
follow him for the rest of his life. 5 
Like most philosophers, John Locke was a product of 
his time. He engaged directly with the most pressing 
questions of his day, and was deeply affected by his 
personal experiences. Unlike many philosophers, however, 
Locke was directly involved with the politics, parties, and 
policies that would help to shape his moral and political 
philosophy. When one surveys the events of Locke's life, 
one is struck not only by the intrigue of his political 
adventures (worthy of a Hollywood blockbuster, no less), 
but by the way in which he adapted himself to new 
situations and evolved from his experiences. Locke was only 
ten years old when the tensions between the Stuart monarchy 
and the Puritan-controlled parliament erupted into the 
English Civil War (1642-48). Six years later, King Charles 
I would be executed and a commonwealth established under 
Oliver Cromwell. Locke's initial experience at Christ 
Church would be marked by religious tension, as Oxford 
.s farker, Biblical Politics, 9. 
8 
remained Puritan during his undergraduate years (1652-56), 
and expelled those who did not conform. During this period, 
Locke was exposed to the sermons of the dean of Christ 
Church, John Owen, who often made the case for religious 
toleration, and noted that the Bible did not advocate the 
punishment of heretics. 6 
After the death of Cromwell in 1658, Locke was so 
shaken by how easily England fell back into chaos he 
welcomed the restoration of Charles II to the throne. As 
William Spellman has noted, "for Locke ln 1660 the monarchy 
could still stand for something above the vertiginous and 
fatal enthusiasms of individual political actors." 7 During 
this period, questions of toleration for Locke were centred 
on the problem of finding a correct way to interpret 
Scripture, and the need for a peaceful civil order. In his 
Two Tracts on Government (1661), Locke held that the 
sovereign must have absolute power over all the indifferent 
actions of her/his people. 8 In searching for principles of 
moral authority, Locke sided with the conclusions of Thomas 
Hobbes, who saw life in a state of nature as solitary, 
nasty, brutish, and short, and advocated a social contract 
that gave absolute authority to the magistrate in exchange 
6 Ibid, 10. 
See William Spellman, John Locke and the Problem of Depravity (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), 49. 
'Parker, Biblica.I Politics, 12. 
9 
for her/his protection. Moreover, the political turmoil 
following Cromwell's death seemed to confirm to Locke that 
the human tendency toward violence, coupled with the common 
misuse of religion, necessitated a central and all-powerful 
governing authority. As John Marshall points out: 
Religious sectarianism had then created what Locke 
described as a 'great Bedlam' England, with 
individuals claiming to be the second Christ or 
claiming personal inspiration in ways that Locke 
described to his moderate Presbyterian father as 'hot-
headed' and 'mad.' 9 
A possible turning point in Locke's thinking on 
toleration may have come in 1665, when he was chosen for a 
diplomatic mission to the elector of Brandenburg at Cleves, 
in northern Germany, and observed the mutual good relations 
between Calvinists, Lutherans, and Catholics. Two years 
later he would write his "Essay on Toleration," which 
showed a notable change from his earlier Tracts. The 
composition of the "Essay" was preceded by Locke's 
appointment as the part-time physician, secretary, and 
speech writer of Anthony Ashley Cooper, later the Earl of 
Shaftsbury and founder of the Whig party. 10 When Locke 
composed the "Essay" in 1667, Shaftsbury was a part of the 
9 John Marshall, John Lo._~kc=: Resistance, Religion and Respo:1sibil.ity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 21. 
10 s. d lgmun , The Selected Political Writings of ,John Locke, x1v. 
10 
Cabal administration responsible for advising the king on 
toleration. Under Shaftsbury's influence, Locke had changed 
his earlier views, arguing that magistrates were only to 
enforce morality in cases of injustice, injury, and threats 
to national security. Furthermore, he argued that the 
oppression of religion caused sedition, and that toleration 
is what united people to their sovereign. 11 Like his earlier 
work, Locke remained skeptical toward Catholics, 
maintaining that one must first preach toleration in order 
to be tolerated. 
In the late 1660s, Locke became close with influential 
Latitudinarian Christians whose progressive doctrine 
emphasized toleration, a minimalist creed, and the 
centrality of reason. These relationships would further 
influence Locke's ideas of toleration and reason as seen in 
his later works such as the Letter and the Reasonableness 
of Christianity. As Greg Forster notes: 
Locke blends elements drawn from diverse theological 
traditions, ranging from theologically conservative 
Calvinism to what we might now call the 'liberal' 
movement of Anglican Latitudinarianism, into an alloy 
that stands apart from standard theological 
classifications. 12 
In 1675, an anonymous tract was circulated in England 
11 John Marshall, Resistance, 19. 
12 Greg Forster, John Locke's Po.Zit_ics of Moral Consensus (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2. 
11 
entitled, A Letter from a Person of Quality to His Friend 
in the Country. The letter was a critique of the abuses of 
the monarchy under Charles II, such as the passing of the 
Test Act, which required holders of public office to be 
members of the Church of England. Many had thought that 
Locke was the author of A Letter, though it is more likely 
that he co-wrote it with Shaftsbury. 13 The king ordered A 
Letter to be publicly burned, and Locke left England for 
France shortly thereafter where he would remain for the 
next three and a half years. 
While in France, Locke visited with many Huguenots and 
took detailed notes on the history of their oppression. As 
John Marshall writes: 
By 1679, [Locke] was recording that 'The Protestants 
within these twenty years have had above three hundred 
churches demolished, and within these two months 
fifteen more condemned' ... Locke recorded on many 
occasions other new restrictions placed on 
Protestants, such as his note in 1676 that Protestant 
ministers were 'forbid to teach above two scholars at 
once' . 14 
By 1679, Shaftsbury had regained his political power, and 
Locke returned to England to join with his collaborator. 
While Locke kept a low profile for the next four years, he 
was clearly affected by his experiences in France. He kept 
abreast of the further measures taken against the 
1
' See Parker, Bil1lical Po.litics, 20. 
;
4 Cited in John Marshall, Resistance, 35. 
12 
Huguenots, and wrote ln their defense in an unpublished 
manuscript that is now known as the 'Critical Notes on 
Edward Stillingfleet.' 15 Over the next two years, Shaftsbury 
was involved in a national movement that attempted to 
exclude James, the Catholic brother of Charles II, from the 
English throne. Known as the Exclusionist Crisis, it 
resulted in the dissolution of parliament in 1681, which 
was to last for the remaining 4 years of Charles~ reign. As 
Kim Ian Parker points out, the crisis was a significant 
turning point for matters of toleration: 
The Exclusion Bill brought the issues of authority and 
political obligation clearly to the fore. If James 
became King, were Protestants who did not obey the 
Catholic monarch in danger of being branded 'heretics' 
and therefore subject to persecution? 16 
Around the same time, Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha was 
published, which advocated hereditary succession and the 
divine right of kings. In the midst of this political 
turmoil, Locke would have to flee the country once again, 
this time bound for the Netherlands. 
Holland provided shelter for many political and 
religious refugees during the 1680s, and was considered the 
most religiously tolerant society in seventeenth century 
Europe. A large number of Huguenots fled to Holland after 
15 Locke, MS c. 34. cited in John Marshall, .John Lccke, Toleration ,3nd 
Early Enlightenment Culture (New York: Cambridge University Pcess, 
2006)' 36. 
:o Parker, Biblical Politics, 97. 
13 
the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, an edict 
which had provided toleration to French Protestants for 87 
years. It was this event more than any other that compelled 
Locke to write his Letter Concerning Toleration. The recent 
Catholic violence against Huguenots and Waldensians in 
France raised similar questions about the prospects for 
Protestants in England under James II. In 1685, 200,000 
Huguenots fled from France, while the 700,000 that remained 
were forced to convert to Catholicism. Those who resisted 
were enslaved, imprisoned, or executed. 17 
In the case of Waldensians, their long and protracted 
history of persecution became a rallying point for 
Protestant dissenters all over Europe. As Marshal notes, 
"the ... persecution of Waldensians was ... often cited 1n 
the 1680s ... as clear evidence of the international 
commitment of contemporary Catholicism to persecution. " 18 
Less than two months after the revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes, the Duke of Savoy, in Piedmont, renounced 
toleration for 14,000 Waldensians in his territories. 19 
Publications of persecution against the Waldensians 
appeared in such places as London and Amsterdam from 1686-
88 from writers like Pierre Jurieu, who published 
17 See Marshall, Toleration, 2. 
18 Ibid, 55. 
19 Ibid, 55. 
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Accomplishment of the Scripture Prophecies (1686), Gilbert 
Burnet, who wrote History of the Persecution in the Valleys 
of Piedmont (1687), and an anonymous work entitled A Short 
Account of the Persecution of the Waldensians (1688), which 
quickly became the most popular source on the subject. 
Likewise, Joseph Mede's 1627, A Key to the Revelation, was 
of particular interest to Locke, as it discussed the 
decline of the Pope as the Antichrist in a millenarian 
chronology that started with Waldensians. 20 The importance 
of the Waldensian persecution could not be underestimated. 
As Marshall notes: 
Accounts of violence against the Waldensians were also 
enormously significant to English and Dutch 
Protestants in the 1680s because in the seventeenth 
century the Waldensians held a central place in 
Protestant accounts of their ancestry as the sole 
'visible' church preserving the apostolic faith 
against its Roman Catholic 'perversion' in the Middle 
Ages, being the only 'heresy' of the twelfth century 
to survive 'in unbroken continuity into the sixteenth 
century to ... link hands with the Protestant 
Reformation. ' 21 
The Waldensian persecution was connected to other 
incidents of Catholic violence such as the burning of 
Protestants in England by Queen Mary, the St. Bartholomew's 
Day Massacre of 1572, in France, or the 1655 massacre of 
the Waldensians. The Waldensians persecution was seen as a 
20 Ibid, 58. 
21 Ibid, 57. 
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continuation of the campaign of Catholic violence against 
medieval 'heretics, ' 22 and was especially significant for 
Locke (and others) as evidence of what would happen in 
England if a Catholic king were to come to power. Like the 
persecution of the Huguenots, it provided further impetus 
for Locke's arguments in A Letter Concerning Toleration. 
The Letter dealt with many of the points that Locke 
had expressed earlier in his Essay Concerning Toleration 
(1667), while taking on new importance in light of the 
recent disturbances in England and in France. In the 
Letter, Locke made it his task "to distinguish exactly the 
business of civil government from that of religion and to 
settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the 
other." 23 Approaching his argument tactfully, he devised his 
strategy in 5 major parts: (1) defining a commonwealth or a 
state; (2) defining a church and its proper role in 
relation to the state; (3) considering how far the duty of 
toleration extends for the church; (4) the magistrate's 
true role in matters of church and state; and (5) the 
limits to toleration. Having lived through the vagaries of 
civil war, exile, and the possibility of execution, Locke's 
arguments in the Letter came from one who knew intimately 
22 Ibid, 59. 
23 See Locke, Letter, 129. 
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the follies of religious persecution. As a man of great 
learning and intellect, he needed only to look at the 
history of his own country in order to predict the 
trajectory of religious intolerance. As he writes in the 
Letter: 
In the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and 
Elizabeth, how easily and smoothly the clergy changed 
their decrees, their articles of faith, their forms of 
worship, everything, according to the inclination of 
those kings and queens. 24 
Another cornerstone of Locke's argument in the Letter, 
and one that is no less relevant today, is his appeal to 
Scripture to justify toleration for religions that are 
outside the Christian fold. Advocates of religious 
toleration in the 1680s often argued for toleration of 
Jews, Muslims, and 'pagans' in an attempt to show the 
incongruity of Christian nations tolerating 'heathens' 
while persecuting their co-religionists. Locke argued for 
the toleration as well as the citizenship of Muslims and 
Jews in Europe, and for the rights of pagans in his 
colonial dealings in the Americas. 25 Unlike some of his 
contemporaries, however, Locke justified toleration of all 
religions as a foundation of Christianity, and denied that 
rulers had any direct knowledge of the will of the divine. 
24 Ibid, 143 . 
.::s See Marshall, Toleration, 10. 
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In the absence of an intrinsically authoritative model 
Locke could proclaim toleration to be "the chief 
characteristic mark of the true church." 26 To those who 
would object he reminded his readers that Christ 
"prescribed unto his followers no new and peculiar form of 
government," but had simply "taught men how, by faith and 
good works, they may attain eternal life." 27 What is more, 
he points out "that the true disciples of Christ must 
suffer persecution" and not "force others by fire and sword 
to embrace her faith and doctrine." 28 Consequently, the only 
way to win converts to the faith was to follow the example 
of Jesus, whom Locke calls the "Prince of peace," urging 
others through "admonitions and exhortations." Such a 
command was not limited to Christians however, but extended 
to those of other faiths, whatever they may be. In A Letter 
Concerning Toleration Locke writes: 
Not even American (Indians), subjected unto a 
Christian prince, are to be punished either in body or 
goods, for not embracing our faith and worship. If 
they are persuaded that they please God in observing 
the rites of their own country, and that they shall 
obtain salvation by that means, they are to be left 
unto God and themselves. 29 
Returning to England in 1688, Locke would see a 
26 See Locke, Letter, 126. 
n Ibid, 130 . 
. f Ib.td, 131 . 
. . , Ibid I 14 g. 
18 
movement toward limited toleration as exemplified in the 
1689 Toleration Act, which extended freedom of religion to 
all Protestant Trinitarian Christians. Locke's theory of 
toleration would also have an impact on many eighteenth 
century philosophers such as Voltaire, Hume, and 
Montesquieu, and serve as an inspiration for the American 
revolutionaries. 30 
Locke's colourful career, from his early experience 
at Oxford, to the political intrigues of his later years, 
offered a wellspring of practical knowledge that he would 
use in the construction of his theory of toleration. The 
Letter, born of some thirty-odd years of thought on the 
subject, would be one of Locke's crowning achievements and, 
along with the Two Treatise on Government and The 
Reasonableness of Christianity, it offered a broad picture 
on the challenges and conditions for an inclusive view of 
toleration. Before we get to the Letter, however, we must 
first take a look at Locke's early years at Oxford. 
30 As recently as 1984, Nathan Tacov could write: "There remains a very 
real sense in which Americans can say that Locke is our political 
philosopher. The document by which vie Americans are an independent 
people, occupying our special station among the powers of the earth, 
derives its principles and even some of its language from the political 
philosophy of John Locke. See Nathan Tarcov, Locke's Education for 
Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), l. 
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Chapter Two 
Locke's earliest attempt to construct a theory of 
civil government remained unknown for some 300 years. It 
was only with Philip Abrams' 1967 edition of the Two Tracts 
on Government (1660) that Locke's early work became widely 
available to scholars. The Tracts were markedly different 
from his later works like the Letter Concerning Toleration, 
showing a preference for authoritarian government and 
denying toleration to different religious communities. The 
discovery of the Tracts raises some difficult and important 
questions about the development of Locke's philosophy. Most 
importantly, it begs the question whether or not his early 
allegiance to authoritarianism tarnishes his reputation as 
a 'liberal' thinker and forbearer of the Enlightenment. 
Many commentators have noted that Locke's argument in 
the Tracts has a decidedly "Hobbesianu flavour, and have 
struggled to reconcile this with his later achievements. 
While it is true that Locke's early writings on civil 
government did share some characteristic elements with the 
philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, his evolution from absolutism 
to toleration was more subtle and refined than it appears 
at first glance. What is most striking in these early 
developments is that in arguing for absolutism, Locke had 
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no interest in promoting any one 'true' religion. On the 
contrary, his main concern in the Two Tracts was whether 
peace and order could ever be achieved if those same 
factions that had given rise to the civil wars in England 
and on the continent were permitted to worship in their own 
fashion. The question then, reconsidered, is not so much 
how Locke could support intolerance and an authoritarian 
form of government, but why he could not advocate religious 
toleration at that period in time. 
In this chapter I will begin by looking at the 
connection between Locke and Hobbes and briefly examine 
what influence Hobbes may have had on the Two Tracts on 
Government. I will then look at the "Essay Concerning 
Toleration,u as a fundamental shift in Locke's thinking, 
where he begins to acknowledge the impracticalities of 
absolutism and argues for the toleration of 'indifferent 
things' in religious worship as the most practical course 
of action. And finally, I will take a brief look at Locke's 
unpublished "Critical Notes" to Edward Stillingfleet's 
views on the problems of separating church and state, which 
shows a deepening of Locke's commitment to toleration, and 
an ever increasing willingness to criticize all forms of 
hypocrisy, be they Catholic, Quaker, or from his own Church 
of England. 
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Thomas Hobbes 
It has been standard in Western liberal scholarship to 
characterize Thomas Hobbes as supporting for authoritarian 
rule. Indeed, the term "Hobbesian" has come to denote 
certain ideological qualities that tend toward rigidity, as 
an abundance of examples readily show. In his 1995 book, 
The Unconscious Civilization, John Ralston Saul argues that 
the impetus for neo-liberal capitalism finds an ideological 
partner in Hobbes' theory: 
Our reforming elites have rejected the most blatant 
aspects of Hobbes' fear mongering to keep us in our 
place, but accepted almost entirely his view of social 
organization as a control mechanism. 1 
Likewise, Paul Sigmund notes this trend in contemporary 
American politics. He writes: 
Locke's political theory has also been invoked in 
discussion of foreign policy, contrasting the Lockean 
view of international relations, shared by Presidents 
Carter and Clinton, as an area where it is possible to 
develop the rule of law by mutual consent, with the 
Hobbesian view, adopted by the administration of 
George W. Bush, which holds that international 
relations are inevitably characterized by conflict and 
opposing interest. 2 
Although these characterizations of Hobbes as a linchpin 
for reactionary politics are easy to make in a post-liberal 
,John Ralston Saul, The Unconscious Civilization (Concord, ON: House of 
Anansi Press: 1995, 162. 
· Paul .Sigmunr:l, The SelFJcteci Political Writings of ,John Locke (New ·rork: 
Norton, 200 5), xxx i.x. 
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democracy, they evoked a much different response in the 
mid-seventeenth century. After the publication of Leviathan 
in 1651, many railed against his apparent atheism, 
including Locke who tried to distance himself from Hobbes 
in his later writings. While the 'Hobbesian' moniker may be 
useful in distinguishing the general character of certain 
theories or practices, like the oft-used phrase 
'Machiavellian,' it fails to consider the historical 
context in which Hobbes wrote, and how his theories were 
determined ln an environment much different from our own. 
What is more, to tar the young Locke with a 'Hobbesian' 
brush can have the negative consequence of tarnishing his 
later accomplishments through association. An understanding 
of Locke's early "authoritarianu Tracts must therefore be 
assessed on its own terms in order to show: firstly, how it 
differed from the writings of Thomas Hobbes and; secondly, 
why Locke felt, at the time of its composition, that 
authoritarian government was both justifiable and 
necessary. 
Leviathan was composed while Hobbes was in exile in 
Paris between 1640 and 1651. Having fled England in 1640, 
before the onslaught of the Civil War, he would remain in 
France until 1651, the same year his great work was to be 
published. In this way, Leviathan was very much a reaction 
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to the perils of sectarian conflict, leading him to 
famously observe that life in a state of nature was 
"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," 3 and to resolve 
a principle or social contract for legitimate government. 
Hobbes argued that the equal capacity of humans to kill one 
another required a covenant of "every man with every man," 
where all the parties of a contract would agree that 
whoever is chosen as the people's representative, will be 
accorded absolute authority in exchange for her or his 
protection. As he writes in Leviathan: 
A commonwealth is said to be instituted when a 
multitude do agree and covenant, every one with every 
one, that to whatsoever man or assembly of men shall 
be given by the major part of the right to present the 
person of them all, that is to say, to be their 
representative, every one, -as well as he that voted 
for it, as that voted against it, shall authorize all 
the actions and judgments of that men or assembly of 
men, in the same manner as if they were his own, to 
the end to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be 
protected against other men. 4 
Hobbes' views caused quite a stir in post-civil war 
England, inevitably helping to alter the political 
discussion on where the locus of authority should reside 
within the state. Most contentious among his claims were 
his depiction of the state of nature as a state of war, and 
his contractual theory of government, the latter evoking 
3 Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thornas Hobbes, William 
Holeswo.rth, ed., vol. III (Londcn: Aalen: Scientia VerlaCj, 1966), llJ. 
·i Thomas Hobbes, Enqlish Works, vol. III, llJ. 
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much disdain from proponents of biblical-patriarchal 
theory. As Stanton points out, "The paternal account 
supposed that the grace that settled on the magistrate as 
head of the visible church gifted him superiority in 
understanding, which in turn entitled him to direct 
others."5 For Hobbes, patriarchal power was not derived from 
the right of the father, but from the consent of the 
multitude, who agreed to abide by a specific covenant. 6 
Implicit in this critique was that it removed the necessity 
of hereditary rule in favour of rule by election. While 
notions of absolute authority remained in place, the 
sanctity of a ruler's right, and by extension, the 
authority of her or his religion, became secondary to the 
needs of securing the civil state. 
In constructing his theory of government, Hobbes drew 
on a variety of thinkers, including Thomas Aquinas and 
Richard Hooker, in order to establish what he believed were 
the determining features of natural right and natural law. 
As Sigmund writes: 
Reformulating the traditional understanding of natural 
law of Hooker and Aquinas, [Hobbes] distinguished 
between natural right and natural law, defining 
natural right as the liberty to do whatever is 
necessary, including killing, too preserve oneself, 
and natural law as the rules or laws that can best 
Timothy Stanton, "Locke and the Politics and Theology of Toleration," 
Political Studies Vol. 54 (2006), 88. 
'' Parker, Biblical Politics, 78. 
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promote self-preservation, if, and only if, generally 
adopted and enforced. 7 
According to Hobbes, magistrates had no obligation to their 
subjects save to use their power reasonably. And since the 
law of nature commanded the imperative of self-
preservation, rulers were given a blank check to bring in 
the reigns of dissent. Notions of limited and mixed 
government were considered foolish, serving to weaken the 
purpose of civil power, and lending it a vulnerability that 
it could scarcely afford. 
On a practical level, there is little doubt that Locke 
and Hobbes shared a strong conviction that anarchy was the 
worst of evils, and that any form of government that could 
secure the peace was better than a state of war. Having 
been educated under the assumptions of traditional 
scholarship and having lived through two decades of civil 
strife, it is not surprising that Locke's first 
articulation on civil government was a defensive one. In an 
oft-quoted comment from the Tracts Locke writes, "I no 
sooner found myself in the world than I perceived myself ln 
a storm which hath lasted almost hitherto." 8 To what extent 
this reaction was 'Hobbesian' lS not exactly clear, as the 
war left most - intellectuals, clergy, and laymen alike -
Sigmund, Political Writings, 241. 
John Locke, The Two Tracts on Government (Cambridge: Cambrid·Je 
University Press, 1967) Philip Abrams ed, 119. 
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ln a constant state of fear and uncertainty. It would take 
Locke several more years of inquiry, debate, and personal 
experience before he could see beyond the immediate need 
for security to the long-term value - both practical and 
scriptural - of toleration. 
The Two Tracts on Government 
The Two Tracts on Government was Locke's first attempt 
at dealing with the challenges, both theoretical and 
practical, of establishing civil authority. The first 
Tract, written in English under the lengthy title, 
Question: whether the Civill Magistrate may lawfully impose 
and determine the use of indifferent things in reference to 
Religious Worship (1660), was a point-by-point refutation 
of Edward Bagshaw's The Question Concerning Things 
Indifferent in Religious Worship (1660), where he made the 
case that individuals should have the freedom to observe or 
reject religious ceremonies according to their consciences, 
and noted that the use of force has no scriptural 
justification as such rites are 'indifferent' and therefore 
of no moral consequence. 9 Furthermore, he maintained that 
the nature of Christianity was to be "free and unforcedu 
and that plurality in worship was "comely and harmonious,u 
., See Philip Abrams, "John Locke as a Conservati·Je" in Two Tracts, 5. 
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and encouraged unity among believers. Locke's second Tract 
was written in Latin and made no mention of Bagshaw's work. 
In both texts, the question at hand was whether or not the 
magistrate should permit the use of 'indifferent things' 
(i.e., those things such as the manner, place, and time of 
ceremony) in religious worship. Both Bagshaw and Locke were 
in agreement that the forms of worship such as time and 
place, clothing and posture are 'indifferent,' and 
therefore unnecessary to salvation. Bagshaw differed from 
Locke, however, on whether or not they should be regulated, 
which he maintained was contrary to Christian liberty. 
Locke would deny this liberty and uphold the right of the 
magistrate to impose uniformity in 'indifferent' matters, 
arguing that it was necessary for the cause of civil order 
and peace. 10 
While the Tracts represent an anomaly of sorts from 
the more 'liberal' Locke of the Two Treatise or the Letter, 
it is important to note that his general conception of 
religious authority and his critique of Christianity 
remained essentially the same throughout his intellectual 
career. In the Two Tracts, Locke rejected the view that the 
magistrate should establish orthodoxy and legislate 
morality for the purpose of salvation, observing that 
;o See Robert P Kraynak, "John Locke: From Absolutism to Toleration," 
The American Politica.l Science Review, 74 (1980), 55. 
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whenever the state would use such authority, it gave rise 
to the sectarian preferences of ambitious clerics whose 
cruelty and hypocrisy undermined the Christian message. 
Locke proffered an alternative conception where the state 
was not to concern itself with the truth of opinions, but 
focus instead on their social value in the interest of 
civil peace. The trajectory of Locke's thinking, therefore, 
from the Tracts to the Essay and the Letter, reveals a 
continuity in principle throughout his career. Where he 
would change over time was in his theological understanding 
of the Christian message, and in his practical strategy for 
addressing the role of civil authority in relation to the 
church and the state. In the case of the latter, Robert 
Kraynak notes that this strategy can assume two distinct 
forms: 
One form is secular absolutism, in which the state 
establishes a religion but makes no claim that it is 
the true religion; it merely imposes an arbitrary 
uniformity on warring sectarians for the sake of civil 
peace. In this case, orthodoxy is replaced by a 
'positive religion', and the priesthood is clearly 
subordinated to the prince. The second form of the 
limited state is liberal toleration, in which the 
state disestablishes religion altogether and confines 
itself to protecting civil interests. 11 
In 1660, Locke opted for the former, although he differed 
from his contemporaries in several key ways. 
:
1 Ibid, 55. 
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Throughout the Tracts, Locke draws on a variety of 
thinkers such as Hooker and Sanderson, in support of his 
arguments for civil government. Indeed, Locke was echoing 
the likes of Sanderson and Parry12 when he stated that only 
an outsider to England could think that such things as "the 
time and place of worship" were insufficient causes for 
civil strife. Such ''liberty for tender consciences" had 
been "the first inlet" to all the chaos that had spread 
throughout England. What is more, such liberty only 
emboldened those who were disgruntled and ambitious and 
susceptible to "zealous mistakes and religious furies," 
being "inspirited" with the dangerous ideas of "crafty 
men." Indulging pleas for liberty was therefore seen as a 
gateway to "contention, censure, and persecution" and "the 
tyranny of religious rage." 13 On a practical level, Locke 
denied that "toleration might promote a quiet in the 
world," by arguing that claims of 'liberty of conscience' 
would be used as a pretext for persecution. This was 
because "conscience is nothing but an opinion of the truth" 
and a "private judgment," and therefore unable to secure 
12 John Parry was an acquaintance of Locke's at Oxford in the late 1650s 
and early 1660s. Influenced by Robert Sanderson, a revered Anglican 
authority, Parry was a staunch defender of the imposition of 
indifferent matters in worship. See Marshall, Resistance, 10-11. 
,John Locke, Two Tracts, 120. 
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the civil peace. 14 While Locke agreed with Bagshaw that 
'indifferent things' are undetermined by natural law, he 
was led to the conclusion that magistrates must legislate 
'indifferent things', precisely because they are 
indifferent. Since 'indifferent things' were not based on 
Scripture, they fell into the realm of civil concerns and 
were left to the discretion of the sovereign on the 
condition that her or his judgment was arbitrary and 
removed from any precepts of religion. The magistrate only 
errs, Locke writes, when she or he: 
presses doctrines or laws upon the belief or practice 
of men as of divine original, as necessary to 
salvation, and obliging the conscience, when they are 
no other but the ordinance of men. 15 
The judgment of the magistrate in such matters is therefore 
expedient requiring only an outward conformity, and can 
hold no claim on the inward beliefs of her or his 
subject's. In this respect, Locke parted from many of his 
contemporaries. As Marshall observes, "Locke did not adopt 
the theory to be popular with many Anglicans throughout the 
Restoration, that penalties could make men consider and 
thus change their beliefs." 16 Locke's position was, on the 
contrary, that the magistrate's rulings on religion obliged 
subjects "to act but not to judge; and, providing for both 
:~ Ibirl, 138, 238. 
15 Ibid, 171 . 
. , Mar::;ha1l, Resistance, 16. 
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at the same time, unite a necessity of obedience with a 
liberty of conscience." 17 In advancing this liberty of 
judgment, Locke allowed for divergent understandings, but 
not divergent practices, thus enabling him to present the 
Tracts as enlivened by "no less a love of liberty" than a 
respect for authority. 
Underlying Locke's position here was his recognition 
of the boundaries between the church and the state. 
Although he does make mention in the Tracts that the Church 
of England is the "purest church of the latter age," he 
gives no indication of his preferred form of church 
government. Avoiding the question of the divine right of 
kings Locke asserts that: 
To meddle with that question whether the magistrate's 
crown drops down on his head immediately from heaven 
or be placed there by the hands of his subjects, it 
being sufficient to my purpose that the supreme 
magistrate of every nation what way soever created, 
must necessarily have an absolute and arbitrary power 
over all the indifferent actions of his people. 18 
Locke's position in the Tracts can thus be seen as an 
assortment of some of the leading theories of his day, read 
through his own lens, blending authority and liberty, as he 
readily maintains. As Abrams notices, Locke "picks the 
purest of all available versions" to represent all 
~ 7 Locke, Tt-.·o Tracts, 17 2. 
Ibid, 122. 
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patriarchal arguments in the Tracts, and "the most 
thoroughgoing statement of social contract theory." 19 For 
example, following Sir Robert Filmer, who wrote unabashedly 
in defense of the divine right of kings, Locke proceeds as 
though he could be arguing from the patriarchal idea of a 
direct grant of power to the heads of families by God, in 
order to legitimize the will of the sovereign. 20 But as the 
previous quote reveals, he was not at all comfortable with 
this line of reasoning. Since his theory would appease 
those who held a patriarchal position anyway, Locke did not 
need to go into further detail. 
In arguing against Bagshaw it was not surprising that 
Locke would echo the arguments of Thomas Hobbes, since his 
was one of the most widely articulated theories of absolute 
government at the time. Locke shared with Hobbes the belief 
that civil society must control those 'primitive liberties' 
that are so common to humans in a state of nature, and that 
the only way to do so was by granting absolute power to the 
sovereign. He disagreed with Hobbes, however, in Hobbes' 
claim that one's private liberty of judgment should be 
restricted and resemble the will of the magistrate. In 
Locke's conception, the surrendering of freedoms was not to 
be undertaken for oneself or for a particular religious 
·'Abrams, "The Politics of Conservatism," in Two Tracts, 74. 
c Locke, Two Tracts, 74. 
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worldview but for the preservation of social order. 21 From 
this it followed that the magistrate should not be able to 
impose 'necessary things' (i.e., things that she/he deems 
necessary for worship), since force cannot change inner 
belief, although she/he retained the right to judge what is 
'necessary' or 'indifferent.' If the sovereign legislates 
'indifferent things' as necessary, however, she/he commits 
a sin before God, but must nonetheless be obeyed. 22 
Ultimately for the young Locke, it was not the 
rational instinct of self-preservation, as Hobbes would 
have it, that maintained the social order, but the 
unrestricted ability of the magistrate to impose her or his 
law, unimpeded by the politics of religious wrangling. The 
advantage of this strategy allowed Locke to use the weight 
of Hobbes' argument to support his theory, while 
eliminating those elements that could undermine his notion 
of a morally guided universe. As Kaynak puts it: 
This perfects Hobbes' theory by making preservation 
the end of government, while creating an obligation to 
obey beyond self-preservation; and it removes the 
natural right to self-preservation as a pretext for 
disobedience. Such a foundation is the culmination of 
Locke's 'persistent strategy' to remove all appeals to 
divine or natural law-in the name of the true 
religion, moral virtue, or self-preservation-above the 
arbitrary will of the magistrate. 23 
Ibid, 77. 
Locke, Two Tracts, 150. 
Kraynak, "From Absolutism to Toleration," 59. 
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In the end, for the young Locke, the restoration of peace 
and order trumped the liberty of conscience. As he writes: 
Such a condition makes men realize that the 
disadvantages of government... [are] far less than are 
to be found in its absence, as no peace, no security, 
no enjoyments, enmity with all men and safe possession 
of nothing, and those stinging swarms of miseries that 
attend anarchy and rebellion. 24 
As important as it was for Locke to draw ln the reigns of 
anarchy, the need for peace and security did not exceed the 
individual's liberty of judgment, nor did it proclaim that 
the magistrate's authority was given by divine right. Locke 
would soon change his view on 'indifferent things' when his 
former assumptions failed to hold, as he voiced his new 
position in the Essay Concerning Toleration. 
The Essay Concerning To~eration 
Shortly after he wrote the Two Tracts on Government, 
Locke began to change his position on toleration by arguing 
for limited magisterial power over worship and by modifying 
his view of human nature. While much was to transpire in 
the seven years between the Tracts and the Essay, it will 
be enough to briefly outline some of the major factors that 
contributed to Locke's transition from absolutism to a more 
inclusive form of toleration. Among the developments that 
~4 
L Locke, Tw,J Tracts, l'J6. 
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would factor into this important change in Locke's thinking 
was his association with Robert Boyle, his trip to Cleves 
in 1665, and his relationship with Lord Anthony Ashley 
Cooper. 
In the early 1660s Locke became friends with Robert 
Boyle, who had played a hand in Peter Pett's Discourse on 
Liberty of Conscience, a tract that argued in favour of 
comprehension in religious ceremonies. 25 This friendship 
with Boyle seems to have had an impact on Locke, as they 
began a correspondence on a variety of matters, including 
issues of social order and toleration. As Marshall notes, 
"Boyle's personal influence in the years after 1660 was 
probably pushing [Locke] away from seeing rigid uniformity 
as necessary to order.u 26 Writing to Boyle from his 
diplomatic mission to Cleves in 1665, Locke reported good 
relations between the Calvinist, Lutheran, and Catholic 
populations. 27 He wrote 
25 Robert Boyle was a friend of Locke's at Oxford, who later became 
renowned for his contributions to science. Today he is largely regarded 
as the first modern chemist and the first scientist to keep accurate 
experiment logs. Pett's Discourse on Liberty of Conscience, was 
published with Boyle's encouragement. As Marshall notes, "The Discourse 
argued, in common with most Anglican works of the period, that liberty 
of conscience was preserved as liberty of belief despite enforced 
adiaphora, but it also pleaded energetically for comprehension in 
ceremonial." He further argues that the Discourse's emphasis on the 
centrality of Christian morality likely helped Locke ''gain an early 
awareness of the 'Latitudinarian' views." See John Marshall, 
Resistance, 46. 
c
6 M3rshall, Resistance, 46. 
_-, In 166') Locke was commissioned to the po.:ot of secretary to the 
diplomatic mission of Sir Walter Vane to Brandenbllrq. He was ser1t to 
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[They] quietly permit one another to choose their way 
to heaven; and I cannot observe any quarrels or 
animosities amongst them upon the account of religion. 
This good correspondence is owing partly to the power 
of the magistrate, and partly to the prudence and good 
nature of the people, who (as I find by enquiry) 
entertain different opinions, without any secret 
hatred or rancour. 28 
While highlighting the obvious benefits of travel, these 
letters show that Locke was grappling with the nuance of 
religious worship as it was practiced in different places, 
and trying to reconcile these observations with his own 
experiences. In addition, he further observed that 
Catholicism in Cleves was "a different thing from what we 
believe it in England,u and that he had not met "soe good 
naturd people of soe civill as the Catholick priests.u 29 
While not all of Locke's correspondence was favourable 
toward Catholics during this time, it does show a change of 
tact by acknowledging the possibility of peace without 
uniformity, a theme he would take up two years later in the 
Essay. 
Locke met with Anthony Ashley Cooper ln the summer of 
1666, one of the most influential figures in the court of 
Charles II. Cooper would later lead an opposition party 
Cleves to pled England's case for either the neutrality of Brandenburg 
against the Dutch or their favour on the side of the British. See 
Parker, Biblical Politics, 14. 
:' John Locke, The Correspondence of ,John Locke, E.S De Beer, ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976-89, 8 ·,-ols.), 1:1'75. 
' Ibid, I: 177, 180. 
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that would plot armed resistance against the King, and 
would serve as a mentor to Locke for the next 17 years. 
Locke's early association with Lord Ashley was an important 
influence on the development of the Essay, which he 
composed in Ashley's residence in 1667, advising the King 
on matters of toleration. Matters of trade also factored 
into their position, since religious indulgence was 
considered a boon to economic development, as the examples 
of the Dutch and the large number of dissenters who traded 
in England clearly revealed. As Marshall writes: 
Although trade was often cited as one reason for 
toleration, and 1667 saw a trade depression that made 
this a particularly pressing issue, it is difficult 
indeed to believe that the primary influence on the 
'Essay' here was not that of Ashley himself. Ashley 
pressed upon the King the legitimation of the 
Declaration of Indulgence of 1672 by proclaiming it 
necessary for the encouragement of trade. 30 
Having confronted a living model of toleration at 
Cleves, and challenged his old theories through his 
association with the likes of Boyle and Lord Ashley, Locke 
carne to a new articulation on the question of indulgence in 
the Essay Concerning Toleration. Ultimately, he was led to 
the conclusion that absolutism was impossible since it 
suppressed the psychological needs of conscience and led to 
sectarian warfare. Furthermore, his position that worship 
fvlarshall, Resistance, 70. 
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was no longer 'indifferent' but rather necessary to 
people's beliefs, meant that the regulation of sects and 
opinions needed to be undertaken if the king was to 
maintain the civil peace. In short, Locke came to see the 
right of conscience not as a matter of religious principle, 
but as a pragmatic solution for the effective management of 
the state. 31 
In the Two Tracts, Locke had maintained that personal 
convictions could not be altered by the use of force. In 
the Essay, he went a step further by arguing for a 
provisional toleration of religious practice. This shift in 
thinking seems to have come from his growing recognition 
that human beings tended toward their own happiness or 
preference in matters of religious worship. Consequently, 
when humans were forced to conform to 'indifferent things' 
they became alienated, and sought out others to join them 
in rebellion. As Marshall puts it: 
It seems probable that the example of thousands of 
dissenters in England who were accepting persecution 
and damage to their civil interests, and the influence 
of an increasing number of hedonic analyses of men 
being developed in the Restoration ... had led Locke to 
think that his theory in the Two Tracts of the 
alienation of religious decisions was simply not a 
sustainable basis for a regime, either in political 
theory or in practice. 32 
=-
1 Kraynak, "From Absolutism to Tolerdtion," 60. 
L Marshall, Resistance, 66. 
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In addition to his changed view on how best to control 
religious dissent, was a change in perspective on the 
natural capacities of human beings. In the Two Tracts, 
Locke had argued that the masses were little more than 
'beasts' in their appetites, while in the Essay he 
acknowledged that all people contained an inherent spark of 
reason, and held the magistrate to be as fallible as 
her/his 'fellow-men'. Reversing his earlier claims, Locke 
wrote that "human nature ... preserve[s] the liberty of that 
part wherein lies the dignity of man, which could it be 
imposed on, would make him but a little different from a 
beast."33 This elevation of human nature was a crucial step 
toward toleration, and would characterize much of Locke's 
later work. 
Robert Kraynak observes that Locke's tact in the Essay 
is to forge a kind of middle ground between Aristotle's 
view of human beings as rational creatures, and Hobbes' 
belief that humans are utterly vain. "In avoiding 
Aristotle's idealism and Hobbes' cynicism" he writes, 
"Locke is led to a new interpretation of human partiality 
as man's pride in his reason or his sense of dignity as a 
rational animal." 34 This insight helped Locke to explain the 
33 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Toleration, J.R Milton and Philip 
Milton, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University PrPss, 2006), 287. 
c,; Kraynak, "From Absolutism to Toleration," 61. 
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impossibility of absolutism: since people believe that 
their opinions are necessary, and necessary beliefs cannot 
be changed by the use of force, toleration or liberty of 
conscience must therefore be permitted. But because this 
was often the cause of sectarian strife, Locke needed to 
mitigate this freedom with certain checks and balances that 
would allow for liberty of practice without impinging on 
matters of civil peace. Accordingly, he maintained that it 
was not human compulsion that was the correct way to 
heaven, "but the voluntary and secret choice of the minde," 
and that it is "only between God and my self, hath in its 
owne nature no reference at all to my governor or to my 
neighbor, & soe necessarily produces no action which 
disturbs the community." 35 Ultimately, it would seem that it 
was practical rather than religious reasons that led Locke 
to his particular conclusions in the Essay Concerning 
Toleration, as this privatization of religion - a theme he 
will further develop on the Letter- clearly reveals. 
Locke's fruitful experience in Cleves, and his 
patronage under the likes of Boyle and Ashley, helped him 
to refine his insights on the dilemma of toleration and 
develop a new perspective on the indifference of religious 
worship, and on speculative opinions in general. As Locke 
'
5 Locke, Essay, 274. 
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brings the Essay to a close, he is careful to point out 
that that toleration is only acceptable if it conduces "the 
majority of one minde and incourages vertue in all." Thus, 
Locke's refined perspective in the Essay was still one that 
clung to the possibility of religious unity, with the 
"termes of church communion as large as may be. " 36 It would 
take several more years for Locke see that unity was no 
more probable under the Church of England than under a 
Catholic monarch, and move toward a genuine theory of the 
separation of the church from the state. 
"Critica~ Notes" 
In leading up to our discussion of the Letter 
Concerning Toleration ln chapter three, we have thus far 
looked at two of Locke's better-known attempts to deal with 
the subject. A third, and lesser-known work that also deals 
with toleration is Locke's "Critical Notes" on Edward 
Stillingfleet's Mischief of Separation and Unreasonableness 
of Separation. Composed in 1680 in response to 
Stillingfleet's defense of legislating Anglican conformity, 
the "Critical Notes" is, in Mark Goldie's estimation, "the 
most important of Locke's works not yet published." 37 
36 Ibid, 302. 
37 Mark Goldie, Pol_itical Essays (Cambridge: CarnbrickJe fJni-J~?rsity Press, 
1997), 372. 
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In his Mischief and the Unreasonableness, 
Stillingfleet argued for the legal establishment of the 
Church of England, as he believed that it resembled the 
true and primitive form of church government. Unwilling to 
expand his rigid view of revealed theology, Stillingfleet's 
thesis very much resembled that of the young Locke in his 
Two Tracts of Government: he saw freedom of conscience in 
terms of Christian liberty, maintained a measure of 
indifferency when discussing the relations of conscience 
and civil order, and assumed the necessary co-direction of 
church and state due to the frailty of human nature. 38 As 
with his "Essay on Toleration,u Locke opposed such notions 
in the "Critical Notes,u pointing out that the use of force 
in matters of worship served only to join people together 
in opposition. Likewise, he continued his support for 
toleration of other religions and for various Protestants 
who were outside of the Church of England, and increased 
his attack against both dissenters and Anglican clerics. As 
Marshall observes: 
[Locke] condemned unequivocally both their own 
pretensions to jure divino authority and their 
compulsion of other Christians and even of their own 
church members. Attacking both Anglican and dissenting 
clergy, the 'Critical Notes' raised the 
anticlericalism voiced in the 'Letter From a Person of 
38 Stanton, "Politics and Theology,u 97. 
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Quality' to a level unparalleled in its venom by any 
of Locke's other works. 39 
While Locke had his suspicions of dissenters and non-
conformists, he was also committed to helping them find a 
compromise with the Church of England. He pointed out how 
both the dissenters and the Anglicans had contributed to 
the problem of civil strife and even noted, in the case of 
the latter, the "apprehension of many sober Protestants of 
the Church of England, that the setting up of all these 
outward formalities ... and narrowing the terms of 
Communion" at the "King's happy restoration" had 
contributed more to the vulnerability of Protestantism than 
"the miscarriages of our dissenters, who I will not deny to 
have had their share in it". 40 Locke's ire was thus directed 
as much at his own church as a source of Protestant 
weakness. 
Responding to Stillingfleet, Locke argued that 
toleration would "lesse cause endless contentions, than the 
imposeing uniformity" unless used to "extirpate all 
dissenters", which was not "agreeable to the Christian 
tradition." Believing that toleration was the path to true 
unity, he upheld the notion that "it suffices for the unlon 
39 
. r-1ar shall, Resistance, 98. 
''i MS Locke c34, 8-9; 144-5. Cited in Marshall, Resistance, 99. 
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of Protestants that they keep up a Friendship under 
different formes and modes of worship". 41 Here Locke was 
echoing his psychological argument for peace through 
sectarianism that he had developed in the "Essay." As he 
writes: 
The readiest way to bring men to their wits, and so 
back again to a reasonable conformity (next to kind 
usage) is to let them wander until they are weary for 
I think opposition and rigor work nothing upon them. 42 
Persuasion and not force was therefore the best way to stem 
the tide of separation. 
While Locke still maintained hostility toward 
Catholics, his criticism was tempered with a distinction 
between one's political allegiance and the rights of 
worship: "If the papists are punished for anything but for 
being subjects to a prince that hath a declared enmity and 
war to us I think they have hard usage." 43 Locke will 
develop this line further in his treatment in the Letter, 
as we shall come to see in the next chapter. 
Where Locke's argument ultimately falls short is in 
its failure to complete the picture of toleration as both a 
practical and a scriptural imperative. As Marshall 
observes: 
MS Locke c34, 142-145. Cited in Marshall, Resistance, 99. 
"- MS Locke c34, 148. Cited in t-larshall, Resistance, 109. 
~, MS Locke c34, Ibid, 2 6. 
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The 'Critical Notes' pointed out the incongruity of 
the use of force to institute ritual observance when 
Christianity was a religion of peace and immorality 
was not punished, but even though it had been hinted 
at as early as the end of the first draft on 
toleration and was present in some detail in the 
'Critical Notes', Locke still did not mount a full 
argument that toleration was a duty of Christianity; 
that was not to come until the opening pages of the 
Letter Concerning Toleration in 168 5. 44 
The addition of Scriptural arguments in support of 
toleration would be a significant contribution to the 
Letter Concerning Toleration, adding the necessary moral 
authority to Locke's various pragmatic concerns. 
Locke's transition from authoritarianism to toleration 
was a subtler shift than it appears at first glance. In his 
early academic career, he advocated authoritarian 
government for the sake of civil peace, while opposing any 
attempt to legislate morality for the purpose of salvation. 
His transition toward a more tolerant outlook came from his 
experiences with various scholars in England and abroad, 
and in having witnessed an example of peaceful interaction 
first-hand. With the Essay on Toleration, Locke was able to 
argue in favour of the use of 'indifferent things' having 
realized that inward belief was a necessary component of 
religious practice. His insistence that, in preventing such 
modes of practice, the magistrate was only inciting 
~~ Marshall, Resistance, 107. 
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dissenters into rebellion showed a new and powerful 
psychological dimension to his argument. With his Critical 
Notes, Locke was able to take his case a step further by 
labeling his own church as complicit in the weakening of 
Protestant unity, and thus advancing a critique that gave 
to his theory a near-universality in character. As we will 
see in the next chapter, Locke will take a dramatic leap 
with the Letter Concerning Toleration, moving beyond his 
native England to France, Constantinople, and even the New 
World, while offering both a practical and a moral argument 
for the dilemma of religious toleration. 
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Chapter Three 
Locke's theory of toleration and the separation of 
church and state has been borrowed, applied, and reworked 
from such thinkers as Voltaire, to Thomas Jefferson, to 
Carl Becker and Leo Strauss. What value the Letter may hold 
for contemporary discussions on toleration is a matter of 
considerable debate. I will attempt to address this issue 
in the fourth and final chapter. In this chapter, I wish to 
highlight some of the divergent commentary that the Letter 
has evoked, and explore how that commentary has effected 
interpretations of Locke's theory of toleration. 
It should be emphasized that few scholars have dealt 
with the purely theological underpinnings of the Letter 
Concerning Toleration. Indeed, Locke scholarship in the 
twentieth-century has often been at odds with such 
interpretations, relying heavily on secular arguments for 
explaining his theory of toleration. Kim Ian Parker speaks 
to this point when he writes: 
Though a number of scholars have stressed the 
religious influences on Locke ... few have devoted 
themselves entirely to Locke's use of Scripture in the 
development of his political thought. 1 
Parker, Biblical Po.Litics, 1. 
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As was noted in the first chapter, the modern rise of 
interest in Locke's political philosophy was sparked by the 
purchase of the Lovelace Collection by Oxford University ln 
1947, which allowed scholars access to many of Locke's 
unpublished works for the first time. In chapter two, we 
saw how a hitherto unknown "conservative" Locke attracted 
scholarly attention in Philip Abrams 1967 edition of the 
Two Tracts on Government (1660). Prior to this time, 
scholars were at a great disadvantage in their quest to 
divine the evolution of Locke's theory of toleration, as 
they lacked several key documents that shed light on his 
early political and religious understanding. Since the 
availability of the Lovelace Collection to scholars, some 
have taken it upon themselves to go beyond a purely 
materialist reading of Locke, and to stress the importance 
of engaging with his deeply held religious convictions. 
Some of these scholars include: John Dunn and Richard 
Ashcraft, who first broached the subject of Locke's 
religious influences; John Marshall, who wrote two books 
(1994, 2006) detailing the political and religious milieu 
of seventeenth-century England and its impact on Locke's 
theory; Jeremy Waldron and Greg Forster, who stress the 
importance of a theological understanding of Locke's 
philosophy; Joshua Mitchell, who argues that Locke's 
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purpose in the Letter is to unveil a dialectic of biblical 
history; Kim Ian Parker, who explores whether or not 
Locke's politics is dependant upon his biblical exegesis; 
and Timothy Stanton, who reexamines Locke's theological 
motivations for denying persecution and offers a valuable 
model for dealing with Locke in the present. 
Taking my cue form this colourful group of thinkers, I 
will argue that a sound theological understanding of the 
Letter Concerning Toleration is essential to understanding 
the moral implications of Locke's theory. Moreover, I will 
propose that a reanimation of Locke's moral criteria in the 
Letter is vital to contemporary debates on toleration and 
the separation of church and state. To limit oneself to a 
secular interpretation of the Letter is not only to err, 
but to overlook what I would argue is its most enduring and 
fundamental appeal - namely, an honest and compelling 
attempt to bring rational, dispassionate argument into the 
realm of religion, while denouncing hypocrisy, and 
displaying respect for the importance of divergently held 
religious beliefs. While some of Locke's prescriptions 
prove difficult for the contemporary world, such as his 
views on atheism, the "essence" or core principles of his 
theory speak very much to the modern dilemma of religious 
toleration. In a post-9/11 world, where political, 
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religious, and secular wrangling threatens to tear civil 
society apart and escalate the already fragile state of 
global security and peace, a theory such as Locke's, which 
was forged in the midst of civil conflict, offers a unique 
and constructive model as we look to the problems that face 
us in the twenty-first century. What is more, a theological 
understanding of Locke' theory of toleration forces 
scholars to engage with diverse religious viewpoints, and 
come to some understanding of how they shape the politics 
and morality of their adherents. While such a line does not 
guarantee that secular-minded political scientists (among 
others) will approach theological positions with respect, 
it may help broaden the debate on the role of religion in 
politics and society by forcing critics to address the 
difficulties and challenges that are posed by religious 
toleration with a greater awareness and sensitivity to both 
their secular and their spiritual dimensions. 
The Materia~ist Rea~ng of Locke 
If there is a single influence that one can point to 
in the modern era that has marked the propensity to read 
Locke ln secular terms it is that of Leo Strauss. Strauss 
was a German emigre who taught at the University of 
Chicago, and developed an influential theory of Locke ln 
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his Natural Right and History (1953). He argued that Locke 
had covertly deviated from the traditional natural law 
teaching in his writings for fear of censorship, and had, 
in actuality, followed Hobbes' thinking on the centrality 
of self-preservation. To prove this, Strauss points to 
Locke's belief that reason could not demonstrate the 
existence of an afterlife, which belies his theological 
concerns. For instance, Locke maintained that divine 
revelation was the only source for the law of nature. On 
the other hand, Locke also argued that, ln order for a law 
to be a law, it must not only be given by God, but must 
also sanction divine rewards and punishments in another 
life. Yet if reason cannot demonstrate the existence of an 
afterlife, then rewards and punishments can have no hold. 
Hence, the law of nature cannot be revealed. In Strauss's 
interpretation of Locke, therefore, it followed that, 
"Natural reason is therefore unable to know the law of 
nature as law." 2 From this Strauss claims that since the 
state of nature is a condition of "pure anarchy," and since 
all human beings have a "want of society," the first and 
strongest desire that God gave to human beings was that of 
self-preservation. The desire for personal happiness or the 
"right of nature" is therefore innate in all humans and, 
~ Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicilgo 
Press). Quoted in Sigmund, Selected Political Nritings, 275. 
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unlike the law of nature, necessarily precedes it as its 
foundation. 3 Through this shift from natural duty to natural 
right, the individual becomes the centre of the moral 
world. Strauss writes: 
According to Locke, man and not nature ... is the 
origin of almost everything valuable: man owes almost 
everything valuable to his own efforts. Not resigned 
gratitude and consciously obeying or imitating nature 
but hopeful self-reliance and creativity become 
henceforth the marks of true nobility. 4 
Strauss declared, therefore, that, "Locke is a hedonist." 5 
In order to achieve happiness a shift away from the state 
of nature is required, with human beings as its prime 
movers. 
While Strauss' interpretations of Locke have been 
widely challenged and largely discredited, they have 
nonetheless had an impact on subsequent research in the 
field. 6 Paul Sigmund has phrased the point well: 
Despite the rejection of Strauss's view by scholars of 
Locke, his interpretation of Locke's thought as 
secular, hedonist, relativist, and egoist continues to 
be influential, especially among conservatives. 7 
In the 1980s, for example, Thomas Pangle, following 
Strauss, argued that Locke's writing revealed a covert 
Strauss, quoted in Sigmund, Ibid, 277. 
Strauss, Ibid, 279. 
Strauss, Ibid, 281. 
' Sigmund, xxvii. 
Sigmund, 273. 
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opposition to Christianity. Similarly, Michael Rabieh 
writes, 1n his essay "The Reasonableness of Locke or the 
Questionableness of Christianity", that Locke's 
interpretation of Christianity was a minimalist creed that 
helped "take God off of people's minds," by basing human 
behaviour on rewards and punishments, and promoting a 
rational and self-interested morality. He writes: 
The Reasonableness of Christianity refashions 
Christianity into not only a support but a 
justification for a mercenary morality by presenting 
Jesus himself as an exemplar of mercenariness. The 
Reasonableness of Christianity for Locke thus consists 
in the political effectiveness of a properly 
interpreted Christianity, and in nothing more than 
this. 8 
Rabieh goes on to remark that Locke's model of the law of 
nature was little more than a thinly veiled hedonism that 
helped to bring about the secular state. 
While Rabieh sees Locke's Christianity as an expedient 
for its ''political effectiveness", Peter C. Myers, another 
Straussian, argues in his book Our Only Star and Compass 
1998), that Locke offers a scientific and historical 
approach 1n his conception of the state of nature: 
The state of nature in Locke is neither Biblically 
rooted nor a mere heuristic contrivance, but rather 
represents an application of Locke's natural-
- Michael Rabieh, ~The Reasonableness of Locke, or the Questionableness 
of Christianity," The Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54 (1991), 
937. 
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scientific or natural-historical approach to the study 
of human nature. 9 
While these and other such examples are rather explicit in 
their recognition and indebtedness to Struass' theory of 
Locke, several other interpreters, who neither mention 
Strauss's influence nor follow his conclusions, have 
continued in the secularist/materialist tradition of 
ignoring the significance of Locke's deeply held religious 
views. Robert Kraynak's essay, "John Locke: From Absolutism 
to Toleration" offers a case in point. 
Kraynak argues that Locke's intellectual/political 
development - from absolutism to toleration - was not a 
dramatic one, but rather an evolution by degrees that 
allowed him to maintain the general assumptions of his 
theory on civil government, while modifying the specific 
requirements for the church and the state. He maintains 
that Locke uses a "political analysis of religion" in the 
Letter, "to show why the disestablishment of opinions is 
necessary for civil peace." 10 To do this, he argues that 
Locke needed to strike a balance between cynicism and 
dogmatism in his understanding of morality and to "find a 
middle ground of 'moderate skepticism' which serves as the 
·. Peter C. Myers, Our Only Star and Compass: Locke and the Struggle for 
Political Pc,tionality (Lanham, Hd: Rowrnan & Littlefield: 1998), 26. 
Kraynak, "Absolutism to Toleration,n 45. 
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basis for a liberal conscience and complete 
disestablishment" of religion. 11 
The advantage of Kraynak's approach is that it allows 
for an interpretation of Locke that diminishes his earlier 
preference for absolutism to one of necessity and 
circumstance. More importantly, it portrays Locke as an 
architect of civil government who was able to read into the 
dividing lines of church and state and construct a balance 
that could sustain competing conceptions of the good. While 
Kraynak's approach is useful for its astute political 
assessment, it ultimately falls short in its failure to 
recognize the authoritative role of Scripture in Locke's 
theory. By ignoring the moral and divine mandates that give 
Locke's works their inspiration and their authority (in the 
eyes of their author and in believers), secular 
interpretations do not take into account the ontological 
support system that enabled them to make sense in the first 
place. To put it differently, how can we take seriously a 
theology such as Locke's if there exists no authority on 
which to place his claims? More troublingly, if Locke was a 
covert atheist, as Strauss maintains, then his moral 
writings rest on an insincere foundation. Writing on the 
'~ Ibid, 45. 
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differences between traditional and modern worldviews, 
microbiologist Jacques Monod offers a fitting observation: 
No society before ours was ever rent by contradictions 
so agonizing. In both primitive and classical cultures 
the animistic tradition saw knowledge and values 
stemming from the same source. For the first time in 
history a civilization is trying to shape itself while 
clinging desperately to the animistic tradition to 
justify its values, and at the same time abandoning it 
as a source of knowledge. 12 
Monod's purpose here, though not addressing the question of 
toleration specifically, speaks to a fundamental difference 
between Locke's time and our own. It forces us to consider 
whether it is possible to use Locke's theory to justify 
present-day codes of conduct without considering the 
intimate link between knowledge and values in Locke's time. 
If we are to regard Locke's theory of toleration as 
anything more than a historical curiosity, then it is 
crucial that scholars contemplate how the theological 
climate in seventeenth-century Europe has impacted 
political thought (both then and now), and how it provided 
both the motivation and the backbone for thinkers such as 
Locke to uphold their moral theories. 
The Theological Reading o£ Locke 
Jacques Monad, Chance and Necessity (New York: Vintaqe Books, 1972). 
Quoted in Huston Smith, Why Religion Matters (New York: Harper Collins, 
20Ul), 41. 
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A theological reading of Locke should ln no way be 
seen in contrast to a materialist reading. It is, rather, a 
supplement that can broaden our understanding of why his 
theory of toleration has been so influential, and provide 
deeper insight into how it can be interpreted today. One of 
the problems that we find with a materialist approach to 
Locke is that it situates his argument as a means-end 
relationship, and reduces it to little more than an 
"eclectic composition" rather than as a paradigmatic theory 
of toleration. When we consider the latter, writes Timothy 
Stanton, Locke's theory takes on a whole new meaning: 
The theory explains why toleration is the political 
consequence of our knowledge and our moral position, 
not simply the default that follows from the failure 
of persecution- should it fail. 13 
This twofold emphasis of knowledge and morality, recalling 
Monod's distinction between knowledge and values, lends a 
depth to Locke's theory that is otherwise lacking. By 
ignoring Locke's requirements of a divine authority, people 
are apt to use his theory selectively, neglecting to 
include the ethical imperatives that gave his philosophy 
its strength in the first place. 
Timothy Stanton's recent essay, "Locke and the 
Politics and Theology of Toleration," makes the bold claim 
·· Stanton, "Politics and Theology," 8~. 
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that Locke, more than any other thinker, offers an 
"articulation of the range of questions necessary for 
identifying the scope" of the solution to the problem of 
toleration. 14 In order for this to happen, he argues, an 
approach must be devised that situates his theory on 
"genuine Lockean terms." Such terms, Stanton points out, 
were first observed by D.G Ritche, and are worth quoting 
here at length: 
Over a century ago, D.G Ritche was able to notice, if 
not explain, how '[a] change in the notion of what 
constitutes a Church, and a change in opinion as to 
what is essential in religious belief and what is not, 
and furthermore, a diminished sense of the importance 
of correct intellectual conceptions about the nature 
of God ... with, perhaps, some skepticism as to the 
possibility of attaining complete certainty in such 
deep matters' are all necessary preliminaries to 
accepting Locke's theory of toleration ... This article 
takes its cue from Ritchie and argues that these, 
together with a changed view of human capacities (P5), 
are correlated conditions sine qua non, without which 
Locke's theory is deprived of its comprehensive 
explanatory power 15 
With these criteria in mind, Stanton seeks to contest the 
popular claim that the main consideration that guided 
Locke's theory of toleration was the notion that 
"persecution is ineffective as a means of instilling true 
belief." 16 The problem with such an approach, Stanton 
argues, is that it reduces Locke's political theory to a 
" Stanton, 99. 
~., Ibid, BS 6 
·' Stanton, 84. 
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'means-end relationship,' and ignores the fact that it was 
founded on a sincerely held philosophical view that he 
based on the human condition. As with Mitchell, Stanton 
points to Locke's belief that people were naturally capable 
of self-direction and therefore able to abide by the 
precepts of natural law. In this manner, Locke was able to 
overcome the older, paternalistic view of government, 17 
which had held that the state depended on divine grace for 
its sustentation. Locke understood that human capacities 
were neither limited to the judgment of any one individual 
nor to the confines of any one "true" church. Church order 
was the product of human invention and "embodied no 
intrinsically authoritative model, only the dispositions of 
those who constructed it." 18 Civil society, for its part, 
implied a "correlative treatment," though it was only with 
the Letter that Locke came to a definitive interpretation. 
As Stanton explains: 
The premise had been a brute assertion in 1667, but 
the status now attributed to the church decisively 
altered its relation to the state and made an 
explanation possible. It did so because it implied 
that the state had no business to promote or to 
protect religion, true or otherwise. If questions of 
revealed truth did not bear directly on the relations 
of the church and state, a role for the state in 
upholding such truth would be impertinent (italics 
added) . 19 
_I Ibid, 85 .. 
Ibid, 89. 
Ibid, 90. 
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Stanton's last point here is one that has often escaped 
notice in Lockean scholarship. For Locke, the separation of 
church and state did not mean that all matters pertaining 
to religion should be excised from civil authority. It 
meant, rather, that those things that were not explicitly 
mentioned in Scripture - indifferent things - could not be 
used by the church or state to be forced onto others. The 
state's purpose was seen more in terms of owing certain 
divine requirements, while keeping to a strictly secular 
bearing: "Because the intentions were God's, the authority 
of the state was secured; because they concerned only life 
on earth, its secular character was guaranteed.u 20 
Take, for example, Locke's view on property, where 
God's design required that humans expand their dominion-
to "be fruitful, and multiply, and fill the earth (Gen. 
1:28) ." Since natural law provided these purposes as 
rationally apprehensible to all, and since these faculties 
were identical in all human beings, "a common dominion over 
the earth was posited on this basis.u Absolutism was 
therefore precluded, and a form of civil government was 
implied that was to protect life, liberty, and property, on 
the condition that God's purposes were pursued. 21 This 
·' Ibid, 90. 
Ibid, 91. 
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canceled out the older Vlew of human depravity on which the 
advocates of persecution laid their claim. God's 
requirements, instead, implied a separation of church and 
state. All things considered, Stanton concludes, the link 
between coercion and persecution - and hence toleration -
only makes sense when people are assumed to be capable of 
directing themselves as God requires. More importantly: 
Such an assumption is necessary to taking the 
cognitive claims of religion consistently seriously: 
people must be supposed able to form true and sincere 
beliefs out of natural resources and capacities common 
to all if those beliefs are to be regarded (in 
principle) as equally worthy of respect. Without this 
assumption, it is difficult to explain why the limits 
of toleration should extend in principle to every 
human being (italics added) . 22 
For Stanton, as for Mitchell and others, it is the 
principles drawn from natural theology, which underscore 
the natural capacities of human beings and the end for 
which civil government is created, that give Locke's theory 
of toleration its explanatory power. Thus conceived, 
Locke's theory takes on a whole new dimension that requires 
scholars to take note (as Parker observes) "that his 
political teaching is integrally dependant upon ... his 
biblical exegesis.n 23 Turning now to the Letter Concerning 
-- ibid, '.JS. 
Parker, Biblic:Jl Politics, ]. 
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Toleration, I will examine Locke's biblical politics with 
these features in mind. 
In his essay, "John Locke and the Theological 
Foundations of Liberal Toleration: A Christian Dialectic of 
History", Joshua Mitchell holds that Locke's theory of 
toleration "is best understood in the context of his larger 
argument about the political significance of Christ." 24 He 
maintains that liberal toleration is founded on a Christian 
dialectic of history, of which Locke's interpretation plays 
a crucial role. To fully understand this, writes Mitchell, 
one must first understand the significance of the New 
Dispensation, which runs something like the following: 
Prior to Christ, the use of force was condoned (i.e., in 
the Old Testament) as a way of eliminating idolatry. With 
the New Dispensation, however, reason and not power became 
the true foundation of duty, which transformed the use of 
political force from a necessary measure into a hindrance 
to both civil peace and salvation. As Mitchell observes: 
"And it is because of this radically new situation that 
Locke concludes that religious affairs ought not to be 
impinged upon by political power." 25 
_;:;,Joshua l\1itchell, "John Locke and the Theological Foundations of 
Liberal Toleration: A Christian Dialectic of Christian History," The 
Review of Pc.Iitics, Vol. 52, l (Jim., 1995), 64. 
c Mitchell, Theological Foundat.ions, 66. 
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In the Reasonableness of Christianity (1696), Locke 
observed that many pre-Christian societies, such as those 
found in ancient Greece or in China, were inspired by the 
light of reason, though they remained morally deficient 
without a clear revelation from God. As Locke writes, "[but 
it was] too hard a task for unassisted reason, to establish 
morality, in all its parts, upon its true foundation with a 
clear and convincing light." 26 Since this use of reason was 
not founded on divine authority and, moreover, was limited 
to the privileged few, it could not assume a universal 
quality. It was only through Christ's revelation that 
reason became the cornerstone of faith by extending virtue 
"to those who previously could not have attained it; 
cure[d] the defects of local versions of morality and 
supplant[ed] it with a universal morality." 27 Being tolerant 
then, was an admission that Christ came to clarify the Old 
Testament law so that all humans could exercise their God 
given reason and discover the light within. It is for this 
reason, Mitchell writes, that Christian truth demands that 
local differences be tolerated. In this way, Locke's theory 
offers a vision of toleration that is critically dependant 
upon a biblical understanding. According to Mitchell, the 
New Dispensation is seen to provide not only the moral 
c 
6 t1i t c he 11 , I hi d, 7 2 . 
_'I Ibid, 7 3. 
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authority for toleration, however, but also a teleological 
impulse that suggests a universal significance for the 
course of human history. As Mitchell writes: 
By its authority, revelation was able to accomplish 
what the philosophers could not: extend the rule of 
reason to those who previously could not have attained 
it; cure the defects of local versions of morality and 
supplant it with a universal morality; and finally, 
level differences in knowledge between those who once 
had the leisure to know and those who did not. Now 
both groups stand before the revealed truth and are 
informed by it. 28 
If Mitchell is right, Locke's theory takes on a universal 
significance precisely because God has played her hand and 
transformed history. In the absence of this mandate, 
Lockean toleration would have no more weight than the great 
philosopher's who, in Locke's words, through unassisted 
human reason, "failed men in its great and proper business 
of morality. It never,u he continues, "from unquestionable 
principles, by clear deductions, made out an entire body of 
the law of Nature.u 29 It is worth repeating here that 
secular interpretations of Locke's theory of toleration 
remain both morally and conceptually bankrupt without a 
firm grounding in his theologically informed biblical 
politics. Once considered, questions of Locke's legacy and 
his relevance for contemporary politics get turned on their 
,' h ' 
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heads, forcing scholars to contemplate how seventeenth-
century European Christian-centric political philosophy 
should be understood in the present and how it may or may 
not apply in a multi-religious and secular world. 
Summary and Analysis of the Letter Concerning Toleration 
After a short introduction by William Popple, who 
credits Locke for having laid forth a theory of toleration 
"more exact than any we have yet seen," 30 Locke opens the 
Letter with a clear declaration of his intentions. 
Appealing to the Christian sensibilities of his audience he 
launches into a rhetorical barrage of provisos meant to 
illustrate the marks of the "true church," in order to 
distinguish precisely what the church is from what it is 
not. Using the Gospels as his guide, Locke seeks to support 
his claim that the 'true church' is one of "charity, 
meekness, and goodwill," and show that, contrary to the use 
of "ecclesiastical dominion" and "compulsive force," a true 
Christian must "make war upon his lusts and vices" and 
follow the example of Christ who sought to persuade others 
only through "admonitions and exhortations" in the ways of 
the true church. As a means of asserting these claims, 
:oJ Locke, Letter, 126. 
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Locke will repeatedly point to the hypocrisy of many so-
called Christians who, while eager to "persecute, torment, 
destroy, and kill" in the name of God and salvation, ignore 
the vices of "whoredom, fraud, malice, and such like 
enormities" amongst their friend's, family, and ln 
themselves. 31 
Playing to the Christian sensibilities of his 
audience, Locke's opening remarks serve to point out not 
only the hypocrisy of those who claim to be righteous, but 
also to warn Christians that those who indulge in such 
vices "'shall not inherit the kingdom of God' (Gal. 
5:21) ." 32 It is in these opening lines that we see the 
emergence of two important themes that will characterize 
much of Locke's argument: the prevalence of hypocrisy and 
lust for power in the temporal realm, and the consequences 
of this behaviour in the world to come. These two themes, 
what John Perry has called Locke's "dichotomy between this 
world and the next," constitute the primary convergence of 
his theory of toleration, supplying it with both a 
practical/political fecundity, and a sound theological 
foundation. The first theme, as we have seen, has had a 
significant impact on political theorists in search of a 
justification for the separation of church and state. 
": Ibid, 127. 
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Within this framework, Locke's theory is made, as Robert 
Kraynak attests, "in order to remove the establishment of 
orthodoxy as a pretext for domination." 33 Sweeping religion 
aside, the materialist approach values Locke's theory on 
strictly pragmatic grounds, and considers his theology (if 
it is considered at all) as little more than a practical 
expedient to establish religion as private good and a 
public evil. The second theme speaks to rewards and 
punishments and the question of morality in general. This 
is what Greg Forster had in mind when he wrote that the 
Letter was a work about salvation disguised as political 
theory. 34 
It is worth noting that this question of the "world to 
come" can be viewed in two distinct ways. The first, as we 
have seen with the materialist argument, is as an 
expedient. Its usefulness, therefore, is directly 
proportional to the extent that it can convince people that 
toleration is truly the word of God. The implication of 
this approach, though not addressed by the materialists, 
implies that Locke uses Scripture to manipulate religious 
belief in the interests of a specific political end, 
suggesting an insincerity of belief. If this is in fact the 
case, then Locke's theory of toleration is predicated on a 
l~ Kraynak, "From Absolutism to Toleration," 63. 
Greg Forster, John Locke's Politics of Moral Conse~sus, 162. 
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lie, which calls into question a whole new range of 
difficulties. If, on the other hand, Locke's religious 
views are sincere, then we must consider how it is that 
they were a product of their time, and how, in light of 
present-day concerns (and if we agree that Locke's theory 
is anything more than a historical curiosity), we might 
substitute or update his ideas accordingly. 
There is little doubt, after reading the opening lines 
of the Letter, that Locke grants special importance to the 
New Testament. Quoting Scripture three times in the first 
thirty lines, Locke's argument is teeming with a 
theological impulse that submerges the reader in the 
teachings of the Gospels. His insistence on the duty of 
charity speaks to a moral imperative, in the absence of 
which hypocrisy and lust for power will surely prevail. 
John Marshall speaks to this point in his book John Locke, 
Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture: 
Although political scientists nowadays tend to pass by 
Locke's argument in the Letter on Toleration on the 
basis of charity and concentrate more on political 
arguments, there is no question that for Locke, as for 
his contemporaries arguing for toleration, the duty of 
charity was a crucial argument for toleration as 
charity was the most important duty of Christianity, 
and also polemically central in order to reply to the 
contemporary argument for intolerance from 'charity' . 3s 
3
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By elaborating on the historical framework in which Locke 
constructed his theory, where theological concerns were 
given the highest regard, Marshall situates Locke's polemic 
on both materialist and theological grounds. The effect of 
this, as we will come to see, is a considerably different 
interpretation of Locke's theory of toleration. 
Defining the State 
In order to clarify his case for the separation of 
church and state, Locke defines what it is that makes both 
realms unique, and asserts that each sphere will be better 
served by restricting itself to its own separate domain. 
Accordingly, the role of the state becomes limited to the 
temporal realm of civil affairs: 
It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the 
impartial execution of equal laws, by laws imposed 
equally on all to secure unto all the people in 
general, and to everyone of his subjects in 
particular, the just possessions of these things 
belonging to this life. 36 
Thus confining the magistrate's power to the things of this 
world, Locke makes clear from the start that authority of 
the sovereign has no business in matters of salvation. 
The laws of the state, says Locke, are made for the 
purpose of equity and justice and are to serve and protect 
''' Locke, Letter, 130. 
70 
these ends. It is because of this, he writes, that the 
extent of the magistrate's "civil power, right, and 
dominion," is limited to preserving the temporal good and 
"it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to 
the salvation of souls." 37 This is so for three main 
reasons. The first is that the care of souls cannot be 
entrusted to the magistrate any more than to the common 
citizen, since God never granted any such authority to one 
person over another. Perhaps in a veiled allusion to 
Hobbes, Locke takes his point further, affirming that no 
such power can "be vested in the magistrate by the consent 
of the people," since doing so would mean that individuals 
would abandon the care of their own salvation to another. 
Such a state of affairs would be contrary to the true 
religion, which Locke insists is dependant on the "inward 
persuasion of the mind." 38 This distinction between the 
interior realm of faith and the outward realm of force is 
what Joshua Mitchell has called "the cornerstone of Locke's 
call for toleration." 39 From this Locke's second reason 
naturally follows. The magistrate's power to use force has 
no bearing on the true and saving religion. While it is 
true that she/he may use force in civil matters, her/his 
~~ Ibid, 130. 
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domain does not extend to articles of faith, dogma, or 
forms of worship. Locke's third and final reason that the 
care of souls cannot belong to the magistrate is because 
force and penalties are contrary to the goal of salvation. 
Thus he inquires, if there is only one truth, why do the 
princes of the world differ so greatly in matters of 
religion? Appealing to logic and to history (what Robert 
Kraynak and others have called Locke's "psychological 
argument"), Locke reasons that if there was only one truth 
then only one nation on earth would be in the right and 
"men would owe their eternal happiness or misery to the 
places of their nativity." 40 As we saw with Kraynak earlier 
in this chapter, the separation of the state from the 
church was enacted "in order to remove the establishment of 
orthodoxy as a pretext for domination." 41 This is why, as 
Locke attests, "The business of the law is not to provide 
for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security 
of the commonwealth." 42 For Kraynak, Locke's "psychological 
argument" provides a political analysis of religion that he 
promotes in order to supply the necessary safeguards 
against the priestly ambition to establish orthodoxy, which 
allows him to put forward a program for liberal toleration. 
~,, Locke, 132. 
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For all its practical purposes, Kraynak's analysis ignores 
Locke's attention to Scripture as a source of sincerely 
held religious conviction. More troublingly, it implies 
that Locke is insincere, using religious language and 
arguments in order to manipulate his readers into taking up 
his position. Alternatively, Joshua Mitchell argues that it 
is the political significance of Christ that provides the 
greatest substance for Locke's theory of toleration, where 
the coming of Christ transformed the use of political force 
from a necessary unpleasantness into a hindrance to both 
civil peace and to salvation. As he writes: "And it is 
because of this radically new situation that Locke 
concludes that religious affairs ought not to be impinged 
upon by political power." 43 This belief in the New 
Dispensation supplies Locke with his moral imperative, for 
it upholds the right of all human beings to use their God 
given reason to direct themselves, without necessary 
recourse to the directives of the state. 
Defining the Church 
Locke defines the church as a "voluntary society" that 
people choose to join for the public worship of God. He 
shared this position with other prominent 17th century 
" Ibid, i'i6. 
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theorists who also understood the church as separate and 
voluntary. As Marshall observes: 
Aubert's Pacific Protestant argued that religion was a 
voluntary obedience and sacrifice of the heart which 
could not proceed from force ... Bayle's Philosophical 
Commentary argued that the 'inward disposition' was 
the 'essence of religion' and that the gospel required 
men to follow it through reason rather than be forced 
as a 'slave'. Crell's Vindication quoted Lactantius in 
arguing that 'nothing is so voluntary as religion, 
which if the minde of him that sacrifeth dislike, then 
it becomes none at all.'" 44 
For Locke, "nobody is born a member of any church," since 
belief, unlike property, cannot be inherited. People must 
choose the society that they believe is most acceptable to 
God, with the expectation of eternal life being the only 
tie that unites them to this end. 45 As he writes in the 
Letter, "No member of a religious society can be tied with 
any other bonds but what proceed from the certain 
expectation of eternal life." 46 This is because the New 
Dispensation (following Mitchell and Stanton) reveals that 
all humans must use their God given reason to determine the 
truth for themselves. 
Responding to the common objection that the "true 
church" must have a Bishop or a Presbyter, Locke quotes 
Matthew 18:20, to support his claim that Christ had imposed 
~.; t-1r3rshall, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture, 651 .. 
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no order upon his church ~ "For the promise he has made us, 
that wheresoever two or three are gathered together in his 
name, he will be in the midst of them."~ 7 This limitation 
precludes the call for ecclesiastical authority and makes 
Scripture the essential precondition for the establishment 
of church order: 
If it not be more agreeable to the church of Christ to 
make the conditions of her communion consist in such 
things, and such things only, as the Holy Spirit has 
in the Holy Scriptures declared, in express words, to 
be necessary to salvation? I ask whether this be not 
more agreeable to the church of Christ, than for men 
to impose their own inventions and interpretations 
upon others, as if they were of divine authority; and 
to establish by ecclesiastical laws, as absolutely 
necessary to the profession of Christianity such 
things as the Holy Scriptures do either not mention, 
or at least not expressly command. 48 
Locke's rule of thumb is therefore prescriptive~ when in 
doubt alr on the side of Scripture. 
In two short, lesser known essays, Sacerdos and Error, 
dated approximately 1698, 49 Locke had written on the 
evolution of the priesthood and the concept of orthodoxy 
arguing that the first Christian communities had been 
focused on how to live a moral life, and did not concern 
themselves with forms of worship, speculative opinions, or 
Ibid, 133. 
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matters of church hierarchy.~ 0 Instead, Locke writes, the 
first churches were developed by the Apostles, who had left 
behind local leaders (bishops or presbyters) in the cities 
they had converted to Christianity. Shortly thereafter, 
these various congregations became united "upon pretense of 
preventing schism and heresy, and preserving the peace and 
unity of the church." It was only after this that churches 
became "subjects of power and matters of ambition," and 
gave rise to "metropolitans and archbishops" until one 
"true church" was created. 51 In sum, the practices of 
excommunication and the punishment of heresy came about as 
a way to consolidate church hierarchy and not because of 
any requirements laid forth in Scripture. In a similar 
vein, Locke concludes in the Letter that since there have 
always been divisions amongst churches, it follows that 
choice and deliberation are necessary and that each church 
should be able to choose its ruler(s) from as long or short 
a succession as they see fit. 52 The end of a religious 
society is therefore the worship of God, and the use of 
force to be employed by the magistrate alone. 
'c Kraynak, 68. 
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The Duties o£ the Church and State 
After defining the rightful boundaries of the church 
and state, Locke turns to examine the magistrate's duty 
toward questions of outward worship and articles of faith. 
Comparing the terrestrial health of a subject to the care 
for her/his soul, he asks, "Shall it be provided by law 
that he consult none but Roman physicians, and be bound to 
live by their prescriptions?u 53 Reasoning that such matters 
are indifferent, Locke concludes that choosing one's church 
is like the choosing of a doctor, and should be left to the 
judgment of the individual. Just as the magistrate cannot 
prescribe the one and only remedy for an unknown illness, 
she or he cannot claim to have care of a subject's soul. 54 
Implicit in this logic is a denial of the divine right of 
kings, which leads Locke to conclude, "Princes, indeed, are 
born superior unto men in power, but in nature equal.uss For 
those who would object, Locke reminds his readers how 
history is filled with examples of the church being swayed 
by the lure of princely power: 
How the church was under the vicissitude of orthodox 
and Arian emperors is very well known. Or if those 
things be too remote, [our] modern English history 
affords us fresher examples, in the reigns of Henry 
VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth, how easily and 
smoothly the clergy changed there decrees their 
Ibid, 139. 
Ibid, 141. 
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articles of faith, their form of worship, everything 
according to the inclination of those kings and 
queens. 56 
While it is clear that all people are to enter into 
some religious society for the public worship of God, and 
in such a one that is appeasing to their consciences, it is 
not so clear what guidelines should regulate the outward 
rites of worship and articles of faith. And while it is 
true that the magistrate does hold power over 'indifferent 
things,' Locke makes it clear that in such a case, "The 
public good is the rule and measure of all law-making.u 57 
The magistrate has no power to enforce certain rights and 
ceremonies if they are outside of her or his lawful 
jurisdiction, as this would constitute an offence to God. 
This is so because 'indifferent things' are not able to 
propitiate the deity, and therefore cannot be mandated by 
human authority. Although it is within the magistrate's 
authority to order that all infants be washed for the 
prevention of a certain disease, she or he may not make the 
same pronouncement if it is done for the salvation of 
souls. 58 The former is a political obligation, while the 
latter is indifferent. 
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As for articles of faith, Locke makes a distinction 
between those opinions that are practical and those that 
are speculative, noting that none should be forbidden so 
long as they don't interfere with the civil rights of an 
individual. 
If a Papist believe that to be really the body of 
Christ, which another man calls bread, he does no 
injury thereby to his neighbor. 59 
In the same paragraph, Locke tactfully disassociates 
himself from such opinions, thus showing a model for how 
one may, in the tradition of Voltaire, disagree with what a 
person says, while defending their right to say it: 
I readily grant that these opinions are false and 
absurd; but the business of laws is not to provide for 
the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security 
of the commonwealth, and of every particular man's 
goods and person. 60 
In such a manner, Locke answers the objections of his 
detractors by exemplifying his edict that belief cannot be 
legislated, and that coercion in such matters is not only 
contrary to the "true church," but corrupts all those who 
would partake in it. As Robert Kraynak has observed, 
Locke's strategy here is to maintain "the possibility of 
orthodoxy, while creating doubt, but not total cynicism 
about discovering it." This reminds people, he continues, 
cJ Tbid, 152. 
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"of human fallibility; it suggests that the truth coexists 
with many errors and is difficult to possess with 
certainty." 61 Combined with Mitchell's observation on the 
necessity of heterodoxy, and the moral implication 
thereunto, we see with Locke the makings of a genuine 
theory of toleration. 
On the question of idolatry, Locke rejects the common 
appeal to the Law of Moses to justify persecution on the 
grounds that it does not apply to Christians. He admits 
that those pre-Christian apostates who were "initiated in 
the Mosaic rites, and made citizens of the commonwealth [of 
Israel]" were guilty of treason. This is because the 
commonwealth of the Jews "was an absolute theocracy: nor 
was there, or could there be, [as after the birth of 
Christ], any difference between that commonwealth and the 
church." 62 With the New Dispensation, it is revealed that 
reason is the true foundation of duty, which allows for 
differences to diminish over time as the universal message 
of Christ becomes available to more and more people. This 
is what Joshua Mitchell had in mind when he called Locke's 
theory of toleration "A Christian Dialectic of History." 
Mitchell's purpose here is worth repeating: "The 
distinction between the interior realm of faith and the 
Kraynak, "From Absolutism to TolEration," 64. 
Locke, Letter, 151. 
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exterior realm of power is the cornerstone of Locke's call 
for toleration." 63 This is so because Christ message was 
universal and could only be realized if reason was free to 
gain hold. As Mitchell writes, "To persecute the heterodoxy 
of others ossifies the relationship of 'otherness' which 
the universality of the Christian message can overcome, 
provided reason is given the latitude to discover it." 64 It 
is for this reason, for the sake of Christian truth, that 
Christians are required to accept heterodoxy and reject the 
use of force. 
It is instructive to note how Mitchell references the 
Reasonableness of Christianity to illustrate this point, 
observing how it is only through a theological reading of 
the Reasonableness, that the significance of the 
unconcealment of Christ can be properly understood. He 
writes: 
By its authority, revelation was able to accomplish 
what the philosophers could not: extend the rule of 
reason to those who previously could not have attained 
it; cure the defects of local versions of morality and 
supplant it with a universal morality; and, finally, 
level differences in knowledge between those who once 
had the leisure to know and those who did not. Now 
both groups stand before the revealed truth and are 
informed by it. 65 
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Perhaps it is not surprising why a text entitled The 
Reasonableness of Christianity would not elicit closer 
attention outside of religious studies departments. In the 
absence of this deeper analysis of Locke's philosophy, it 
is not difficult to see how scholars (and in particular 
political scientists) might miss the underlying 
significance of Christ for Locke's theory of toleration. 
Greg Forster speaks to this point when he observes that the 
Reasonableness, although written for less politically 
urgent reasons, is of "great interest to the construction 
of moral consensus along the lines suggested in the 
Letter.u 66 The fact that it was composed some ten years 
after the Letter, and served to fill-in some of the 
theologico-political gaps left in his earlier works, should 
be reason enough to secure its value as a source of insight 
for understanding Locke's political theory. 
The Prob~em o£ Atheists and Catholics 
Where Locke has no doubt gotten into trouble among 
modern scholars of political philosophy is with his seeming 
intolerance toward atheists and Catholics. Consider the 
following statement by Anne Philips: "That the principles 
did not extend to either atheists or Catholics further 
b•. F'orster, ;'1,)ra.l Consensus, 131. 
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confirms that Locke was not in the business of being even-
handed." 67 This assumption that Locke employed a double 
standard in matters of toleration has sometimes been used 
to discredit his standing in the Western liberal tradition. 
How can he really be "liberal", it is asked, if his vision 
of toleration only extends to Protestant Christians? As we 
will see in the next section, Locke's theory did in fact 
extent beyond Protestants to pagans (polytheists), Jews, 
and Muslims alike. Upon closer examination, it becomes 
clear that it is political considerations, and not any 
objection to religion (in the case of Catholics) that Locke 
finds problematic. On the question of atheists and 
Catholics Locke writes, "No opinions [doctrines) contrary 
to human society, or to those moral rules which are 
necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be 
tolerated by the magistrate." 68 The question of tolerating 
Catholics was one of considerable debate at the time of the 
Letter's composition. As John Marshall notes, the Catholic 
position that belief did not need to be kept with heretics 
"was cited frequently by Protestants as one reason that 
Catholics had revoked the Edict of Nantes." Moreover, 
~, Anne Philips, ~The Politicisation of Difference: Does this Make for a 
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Marshall observes that the Catholic question was not a 
simple one and required careful attention to nuance within 
the faith: 
It seems probable that in writing the Letter Locke 
thought that at least some Catholics in England and in 
the Netherlands were politically as well as 
religiously tolerable, as they did not hold that faith 
did not have to be kept with heretics, nor that 
excommunicated kings were deposed, and were themselves 
tolerant and yet at the same time thought that very 
many Catholics, especially but not merely Jesuits, 
were indeed intolerable, and wished to register both 
of these position in the Letter. 69 
Locke's purpose was therefore to point out the incongruity 
of serving two Master's, as was the case of English 
Catholics who divided their allegiance between the king and 
the Pope. Placed in the proper context, the nuance of his 
proposal becomes clear, which amounted to more of a 
contingency than an outright command. As Forster has 
noticed, "It was not the religion of Catholicism or Islam 
that Locke finds intolerable, but the violent and 
subversive political use to which those religions were 
put." 70 To put it simply, toleration for Locke is limited to 
those who are willing to tolerate others. 
On the question of atheists, Locke writes that, 
"Promises, covenants, and oaths ... which are the bonds of 
human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking 
t
9 f\1arshall, Earl]/ Enlight~IJ;r:~nt Ct1lture, 692. 
''
1 Forster, l 7 4. 
84 
away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all." 71 
Behind Locke's furor here lay the assumption that atheism 
itself is a form of intolerance because it denies the moral 
and theological ground upon which society can be 
maintained. An unpublished manuscript that Locke composed 
in the 1690s called Ethica B, explains the point further: 
"If a man were independent he could have noe law but his 
own will noe end but himself. He would be a God to himself, 
and the satisfaction of his own will the sole measure and 
end of all his actions." 72 Such a line was commonplace in 
seventeenth century Europe, as atheists were seen as 
'profligate wretches' and 'libertines' who lived their 
lives in hopes that their deeds would go unpunished. 73 James 
Tully puts it thusly: 
For Locke, as for almost all his contemporaries, only 
belief in a God who punishes the wicked and rewards 
the virtuous in an after life provides most 
individuals with the motive- self-interest -
sufficient to cause them to act morally and legally. 74 
If Locke's concern with "rewards and punishments" seems 
antiquated, one need only to consider the plague of moral 
relativism that has marked the nineteenth, twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries to understand his concern. Add to 
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this the fact that belief in a Christian God was nearly 
unanimous ln 17th century Europe, and we can better grasp 
the logic of his statement. In contrast, Locke held no such 
restrictions for polytheism, for it, too, offered the 
rewards and punishments of the divine. 
Can To~eration extend to non-Christian Re~igions? 
Locke's argument for the toleration of other religions 
is perhaps best understood through a theological lens, 
provided by his understanding of the New Dispensation. As 
we have seen Lockean toleration finds its greatest 
limitation with atheists since, as he writes, "The taking 
away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all." 75 
This is because without a moral code that lS binding, 
promises cannot be kept or made. Locke is therefore able to 
tolerate pagans, Muslims, and Jews, who all believe in the 
existence of rewards and punishments, thus enabling the 
proper requirements for moral behaviour. With the New 
Dispensation, reason became the standard of duty, canceling 
out the use of force to root out idolatry. Instead, only 
"admonitions and exhortations" could bring people to the 
"true church." As Locke writes in the opening lines of the 
Letter, "These things, and all others of this nature, are 
75 
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much rather marks of men striving for power and empire over 
one another than of the Church of Christ." 76 If reason is 
inhibited by external force, and this is as true for 
Muslims as it is for Christians, then salvation cannot 
prevail for nshe will be but the weaker for [she cannot do 
so through] any borrowed force violence can add to her." 77 
The obverse of this is seen when Kraynak writes, "When 
orthodoxy is subordinated to sincerity and the priesthood 
is replaced by individual self-reliance, the climate of 
opinion has been created for a tolerant personal 
religion." 78 While it is true that Locke does place 
sincerity as the benchmark for true and saving belief, 
Kraynak's contention runs into trouble when it comes up 
against the paradox of the New Dispensation- i.e., that 
universality and heterodoxy are not inconsistent. In light 
of this requirement, we find pause when he observes the 
following: 
Only such conditions could sustain the delicate 
inconsistency that one orthodoxy exists, but everyone 
is orthodox who sincerely believes he is so; or that 
anyone can be saved by a personal religion which he 
sincerely believes to be true for himself. 79 
While it may be true that Locke is hesitant to declare what 
constitutes orthodoxy, he does not maintain that anyone can 
Ibid, 126. 
Ibid, 153. 
h Kraynak, "From Absolutism to TolPrat.ion," 6:J. 
'J Kraynak, 65 ~ 
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be saved for simply believing what is true for themselves. 
If this were the case, then the most minimal of doctrines 
that were meant, to quote Michael Rabieh, "to take God off 
of people's minds" 80 would suffice for salvation. Instead we 
see with Locke a consummate unwillingness to concede as to 
what is the true and saving religion, coupled with an 
insistence that Christ paved the way for humans to discover 
the "true church" for themselves. Since Christ erected no 
church to guide the dictates of the state, religion was 
necessarily separate, and no coercion in matters of faith 
was to be employed for any reason. Whether or not Locke 
believed that those who died a pagan or Jew would not find 
salvation, he would point out that: 
Not even Americans [i.e., American Indians], subjected 
unto a Christian prince, are to be punished either in 
body or in goods, for not embracing our faith and 
worship. If they are persuaded that they please God by 
observing the rites of their own country, and that 
they shall obtain happiness [salvation] by that means, 
they are to be left unto God and themselves. 81 
Locke's strategy here is twofold: first, he provides the 
necessary conditions for civil peace by elaborating that 
coercion is inimical to salvation. He bases this on the 
assumption that Christ brought light and reason to the 
world, the exercise of which was the only way toward 
salvation. Second, Locke maintained the strength of his 
~r~ Eab.ieh, The J~easonab_leness o.r Locke, 937. 
,_, 
Locke, Letter, 149. 
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theological convictions by erecting not a minimalist creed, 
but rather one that required people to engage with the 
message brought by Christ in the New Testament: 
But since men are so solicitous about the true church, 
I would only ask them here by the way, if it be not 
more agreeable to the church of Christ to make the 
conditions of her communion consist in such things, 
and such things only as the Holy Spirit has ln the 
Holy Scriptures declared, in express words, to be 
necessary to salvation? 82 
Accordingly, Christians are not obliged to be sinless 
ambassadors of the faith, but are required to be free to 
discover the truth for themselves. Adherents of other 
faiths are to be formally tolerated since persecution is 
contrary to Christ's teaching, and since all people, "when 
they groan under any heavy burden, endeavour naturally to 
shake off the yoke that galls their necks.u 83 
In developing his argument, Locke cleverly employs the 
Gospels to show that if charity and goodwill direct us to 
look kindly upon those with whom we differ, encouraging 
exhortations instead of violence, then it is not only 
different churches we must accept, but those of different 
religions as well. His requirements for toleration proceed 
from both a pragmatic impulse based on history and reason, 
and from a firm theological conviction, which animates his 
theory and provides it with its moral integrity. Modern 
Ibid, 133. 
1
" Ibld, 160. 
89 
theories of toleration that wish to proceed along Lockean 
lines must first consider how Locke's theology served as a 
backbone for his political philosophy. Once this 
distinction is made clear, an opportunity arises to examine 
how both the secular and the spiritual combined in the 
construction of his liberal theory of toleration, thereby 
creating a space for this necessary interplay to unfold. 
Moreover, attempting to use Locke's theory for the present 
requires that scholars make clear what it was that gave it 
its strength in the first place, so as to situate it on a 
broader platform for examination. 
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Chapter Four 
The sheer volume of contemporary scholarship on 
Locke's political and moral philosophy is enough to suggest 
not only a lingering influence, but also affirms the 
foundational character of his thought and its continued 
relevance to the modern world. Precisely what this 
relevance is and where it can be applied, is a question 
that I will attempt to answer in due course. Thus far, my 
purpose has been look at the evolution of Locke's theory of 
toleration, staring with his more authoritarian argument in 
the Two Tracts, followed by an analysis of some of the 
leading proponents for a theological understanding of his 
moral philosophy. As a foil to the ''Straussianu approach, 
we looked at Timothy Stanton's essay, "Locke and the 
Politics and Theology of Tolerationu, which examined 
Locke's theological motivations for denying persecution, 
and proposed a model for understanding Locke in the 
present. Joshua Mitchell, for his part, offered a 
persuasive argument for the value of the New Dispensation, 
and proposed that Locke's theory of toleration "is best 
understood in the context of his larger argument about the 
political significance of Christ.u 1 My point of departure 
tvlitchell, "Theulogical Foundations of Lib,o:ral Toleration," 64. 
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has been a critical analysis of the Letter Concerning 
Toleration, while drawing on certain themes and ideas from 
some of Locke's other works such as the Reasonableness of 
Christianity and the Two Treatise of Government. In 
constructing my argument, I have been less interested ln 
demonstrating the "truthu of Locke's theory of toleration, 
and more inclined to highlight those arguments that I have 
found most compelling so as to suggest what might be 
missing (or at least lacking) in contemporary scholarship. 
In light of these considerations, it seems evident 
that despite a continued interest in Locke's political 
philosophy, combined with a persistent suspicion that he 
does indeed have something to say to our present situation, 
few have been able to effectively argue Locke's position 
for toleration with his religious argument in tact. The 
corollary of this, as we have seen most notably with the 
Straussian's, has been the establishment and persistence of 
a pre-conceived bias that frequently depicts Locke's 
political philosophy as a thinly veiled hedonism that 
encourages self-interest and self-preservation as the right 
of nature and foundation of civil society. Apart from 
ignoring Locke's firmly held theological convictions, such 
a line has had the negative consequence of stripping his 
political prescriptions of their moral content. 
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This point is perhaps no better illustrated than with 
Locke's theory of property, which has been generally 
considered only for its utility in helping to overturn the 
old feudal order, and providing a justification for the 
unlimited acquisition of land. If we consider Locke's 
position from a theological perspective, however, a very 
different picture emerges. As Parker points out, Locke 
derives his theory of the natural right to property from 
the Book of Genesis, where humans are commanded to "be 
fruitful, and multiply, and fill the earth" (1:28). For 
Locke, this meant that property is to be used so long as it 
is in accordance with the rules of natural law, which 
restricts the acquisition of land to the needs of 
individuals and to their families, while ultimately serving 
the will of God. Crucially, land cannot be withheld it if 
it becomes the cause of another's starvation, nor can it be 
allocated arbitrarily: 
Indeed, ln almost all cases, natural rights are 
limited by the law of nature and by Scripture such 
that it lS more accurate to speak of Locke as 
advocating a series of obligations rather than 
individualistic rights, as he is so often taken to 
have done. These obligations are to be seen in terms 
of preservation- that is, preservation of God's 
workmanship and property, rather than the maximization 
of an individual's pleasure or wealth. 2 
~ Kim Ian Parker, "The Creator, In.Jlienable Rights, and the Genesis of 
,John Locke's Theory of Property," forthcoming in Phil oscphy, Cul t:ure, 
.Jni TrJditions, ed. by WillL'tm ::'·r~eet, 2007, 10,11. Pa<Je numberir;q is to 
the typescript. 
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This example of how Locke interpreted his politics 
through the Bible shows how Scripture served not only as a 
benchmark, so to speak, for his understanding of the proper 
role of social and economic policies, but also how it 
provided both the moral authority and the limitations for 
its rightful use in the first place. Stripped of its 
biblical requirements, Locke's philosophy does indeed lend 
itself to utilitarian and hedonistic conclusions, both of 
which fail to grasp his original intentions and, more 
crucially, neutralize his moral/ethical obligations. 
Although some scholars have made significant inroads in 
arguing for the importance of Scripture in Locke's 
political philosophy (i.e., Forster, Marshall, Stanton, and 
Parker), none have been so ambitious as to embark on an ln-
depth exploration of the relevance of Locke's theory of 
toleration for the modern world. The one who comes closest 
to this is Forster, though to be fair to the others, their 
attentions were focused elsewhere. 
Greg Forster's 2006 book, John Locke and the Politics 
of Moral Consensus, makes the bold claim that Locke's dual 
emphasis on faith and reason leads to an "ecumenical 
philosophy of liberalism", 3 which he perceives as not only 
Fur5tco.r, Moral Consensus, 260. 
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central to Locke's thinking, but also crucial to solving 
"the violent Scylla of fanaticism and the all-consuming 
Charybdis of relativismu 4 as it exists in the twenty-first 
century. His arguments for a renewed liberalism aside, 
Forster's book offers some useful insights on the 
importance of Locke's social philosophy in light of his 
theological understanding. For him, Locke is "well 
qualified to fillu the need for a reinvigorated political 
philosophy "because he shares our fear of the primordial 
fanaticism that religion can unleash.u 5 This is important 
because "social principles must be constantly renewed if 
they are to endure.u As liberalism finds its "deepest 
historical rootsu in the religious reforms of sixteenth-
and seventeenth-century Europe, a "moral doctrineu lies at 
its foundation, which provides the basis for human equality 
in the political realm. The effect of this, he notes, was 
no less than monumental: "It was no longer enough to say 
that God would treat us all equally; liberals demanded that 
political authorities follow God's example in this regard.u 6 
This condition prevented society from adopting extreme 
forms of individualism and rationalism, which "are 
dangerous because government action must have a basis in 
Forster, lbicl, :059. 
Ibid, :-::60. 
L Ibid, 263. 
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shared moral principles if it is to be accepted as 
legitimate." 7 In modern times, the privatization of religion 
has had the effect of promoting a "feel-good 
'spirituality'" on the one hand, and a "dangerously 
irrational, and illiberal" religious enthusiasm on the 
other. 8 As a consequence, we now hang on a tenuous thread of 
"cultural inertia arising from previous generations of 
liberal theorists whose moral visions were persuasive in 
the population at large." 9 
Forster's conclusion has a persuasive power precisely 
because he is able to recognize the moral vacuum that is 
created when "society loses the intellectual sources of its 
principles," recalling Monad's distinction between 
knowledge and values that was discussed in chapter three. 
Forster's attempt to reinvigorate the theological 
foundation of Locke's theory for the present is unique in 
its depth and breadth, covering a range of Locke's most 
influential works in order to show how 
[his] theory of moral consensus in epistemology, 
theology, and politics points the way to an effective 
method of reconciling, in our own time, religious and 
cultural diversity with the need for social and 
political solidarity built on a moral foundation. 10 
7 Ibid, 264. 
' Ibid, 267. 
' Ibid, 272. 
:o Ibid, 272. 
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Forster's observations here point to a hitherto unexplored 
dimension to Locke's philosophy that, while ambitious and 
hard to pin-down, highlight what is most valuable for the 
modern dilemma of religious toleration - namely, a theory 
that is at once critical of the dominant structures of 
politics and belief while, at the same time, sensitive to 
the vagaries of human expression and the need for some 
connection to the divine. Unfortunately, Forster's 
partiality for a Christian solution to these problems seems 
to overshadow his goals of ecumenical harmony, despite his 
objections to the contrary. Near the end of his book, for 
example, Forster pauses to assure his readers that he lS 
not calling for the "imposition of any one particular set 
of religious beliefs" which, he rightly concurs, would be 
illiberal." 11 Yet the tenor of his argument throughout the 
book suggests a preference for religious over secular 
culture, as is clear from his assertion that " ... religious 
theories of toleration have an advantage over secular 
theories." The reason for this, he believes, is that 
religious toleration, unlike its secular counterpart, lS 
not required to maintain neutrality on moral issues, but 
"can place the necessary limits on toleration without 
contradicting its own principles." These limits, moreover, 
." Ibid, 268. 
97 
"can be justified by appeal to God's law." 12 While Forster 
is reluctant to state what he believes are the precise 
requirements of God's law, his argument seems to imply a 
near-facsimile appropriation of Locke's political theology. 
This is clearly illustrated by his view on the role of 
God's law in the political system: 
But if the purpose of political power is to protect 
the God given freedom and equality of individuals, and 
authorities are required to allow expansive latitude 
for differing interpretations of God's law whenever 
possible, then the political system will be liberal. 13 
For Forster, the essential problem is how to balance 
the need for individualism and rationalism with a morally 
authoritative philosophy that will provide the proper 
limits for political society while avoiding extremes. 
Although certainly a noble goal, Forster's methods for 
achieving this end seem over-determined by an ambivalent 
commitment to affirming "God's law" within the overall 
political structure, and seem to ignore the contemporary 
realities of a multi-religious and secular world. Consider 
his argument for the existence of an objective moral 
authority: 
It is one thing to say that individuals are 
independent moral agents, and quite another to say 
that individuals are independent moral agents that 
answer to God in the next life for their sins in this 
one. This formulation rules out the possibility that 
"" Ibid, 2 65. 
1
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morality is simply subjective; God is undeniably an 
objective moral authority. 14 
Forster's approach here can be read as reaffirming Locke's 
oft-quoted line, "The taking away of God, though but even 
in thought, dissolves all." 15 Indeed, the fear of rewards 
and punishments, along with the unifying character of a 
genuine and widely held religious belief, do provide a 
firmer basis for moral consensus than the "heathen 
philosophers" who, as Locke observed, made laws "who had no 
other aims but their own power, reached no father than 
those things, that would serve to tie men together in 
subjection. " 16 
The problem with this solution of course (as should be 
obvious to most contemporary readers), is that we no longer 
live in a world where such assumptions can gain wide 
acceptance (or consensus, to use Forster's term). Moreover, 
it is equally possible, as the Dalai Lama has observed, to 
"talk about ethics and morality without having recourse to 
religion." 17 Despite the many insightful observations that 
Forster makes in his book, offering an invaluable and 
persuasive argument for the moral foundations of Lockean 
liberalism, his suggestions for reading Locke in the 
1
<1 Ibid, 265. 
15 Locke, Letter, 158. 
' Locke, Reasonableness, 56. 
~ 7 Dalai Lama, Ancient Wi:cxlom Nod>:crn Woc.2d (Little Brovm C!r,d Company, 
1999) 1 28, 
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present run the risk of further alienating the already 
abundant reservoir of Locke scholars who either dismiss or 
reject his theology altogether. When we read, for example, 
on the final page of his book, that if liberalism is to 
survive in the long term "it must return to the divine,u 18 a 
red flag goes up for many who may have otherwise found his 
argument convincing. While we might agree that Locke's 
philosophy can offer a method of reconciling religious 
diversity within the political realm by providing a moral 
foundation, 19 Forster fails to address how this might play 
out amongst a world of competing viewpoints, to say nothing 
of the extremists and relativists of whose disproportionate 
influence he is understandably concerned. Moreover, he 
fails to effectively differentiate the "essenceu of Locke's 
prescriptions from their historical/contextual 
application. 20 In other words, he fails to effectively 
salvage from Locke's theory what is potentially universal 
and therefore applicable to the present, from what is 
particular to his time and place . 
. c 
Forster, 272. 
;
9 Ibid, 272. 
~ 0 By "essence" I mean to suggest those elements of Locke's argument 
such as his fear of orthodoxy, his insistence on human fallibility, or 
his commitment to a critical reading of Scripture, that transcend the 
narrow context of seventeenth-century Protestant England, and can be 
adapted (with some revision) to both secular and multi-religious 
contexts in the modern world. In this sense, we might be able to 
separate Locke's precise requirements (such as his insistence on 
rewards and punishments) from the response that his criticism is 
intended to have on his readers. 
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A possible supplement to Forster's line of reasoning 
can be found in Timothy Stanton's essay "Locke and the 
Politics and Theology of Toleration." As noted in chapter 
three, Stanton makes the bold assertion that Locke offers, 
more than any other thinker, an "articulation of the range 
of questions necessary for identifying the scope" of the 
solution to the problem of toleration. 21 In his attempt to 
situate Locke's theory on genuine terms, 22 Stanton shows how 
Lockean toleration is derived from principles of natural 
theology, which outline the equality of all human beings in 
their capacities toward reason and their ability to choose 
a form of government that, in theory, is representative of 
their opinions, ideas, and interests. Stanton cautions that 
no modern theorist who proceeds on Lockean assumptions will 
wish to reproduce him facsimile, but must instead: 
Adduce a suitably profane substitute for natural 
theology, capable of doing the same conceptual work, 
assuming that the arguments that depend on the former 
cannot secure sufficient adherents today. Without 
this, the moral element often attributed to the 
concept of toleration is lacking: the protections the 
state affords are morally unspecific and quite 
unassured. 23 
:
1 Stanton, 99. 
-- For example, by denying that it is predicated on a means-end 
relationship where persecution is rejected because it is deemed 
"ineffecti7e as a means of instilling true belief.u Ibid, S4. 
Ibid, 99. 
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Where Forster assumes that we can simply "return to the 
divine," Stanton sees this as a stumbling block to Locke's 
thesis. His five-point methodology or "necessary 
preliminaries"24 which, he maintains, gives Locke's theory 
its explanatory power, offer some cues for a potential 
universal reading of Lockean toleration. In particular, his 
third, fourth, and fifth preliminaries merit close 
attention: 
'a diminished sense of the importance of correct 
intellectual conceptions about the nature of God 
(P3) ... with, perhaps, some skepticism as to the 
possibility of attaining complete certainty in such 
deep matters (P4) ... together with a changed view of 
human capacities (PS) ... '"25 
We find a corollary in these Lockean conditions with modern 
thinkers such as Chris Hedges. 
In his recent essay, "Why I don't believe in 
Atheists," 26 Hedges challenges secular detractors of 
religion to embrace a more expansive view of the divine, 
showing parallels with Locke's skepticism on the nature of 
God in the Letter and in several of his other works. As 
Hedges writes: 
God is a human concept. God is the name we give to our 
belief that life has meaning, one that transcends the 
c4 See page 53 for Stanton's five-point argument. 
~-~ Ibid, 8 4. 
2( Chris Hedges, "I Don't Believe in Atheists" Truthdig. 
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world's chaos, randomness and cruelty. To argue about 
whether God exists or does not exist is futile. The 
question is not whether God exists. The question is 
whether we concern ourselves with, or are utterly 
indifferent to, the sanctity and ultimate 
transcendence of human existence. God is that 
mysterious force-and you can give it many names as 
other religions do-which works upon us and through us 
to seek and achieve truth, beauty and goodness. God is 
perhaps best understood as our ultimate concern, that 
in which we should place our highest hopes, confidence 
and trust. 27 
The reader will have noticed that the above is considerably 
more tolerant than the precise prescriptions offered in 
anything written in Locke's moral or political philosophy. 
Indeed, Locke's assessment of other religions in the Letter 
as "false and absurd," 28 is a far cry from Hedges' 
exhortations. In considering Locke's theory of toleration 
it is essential that we bear in mind some of the obvious 
historical biases that one might encounter, so that readers 
will be less inclined to throw out the proverbial baby with 
the bathwater, as is so often the case. Most notably, we 
would need to bracket-off Locke's Christian-centred 
approach, his emphasis on the power of divine rewards and 
punishments and the promise of salvation, and deal with the 
very difficult question of how he perceives religious 
authority as those things that are revealed by God. Steven 
Hedges, I don't believe in Atheist's, 1. 
:r It should be noted, however, that Locke was making a rhetorical point 
to say that we cannot regulate opinions with which we disagree. Locke, 
Lerter, 1')2. 
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Forde notices this difficulty when he writes that for 
Locke, "it appears that the more rational a man is, the 
more providence becomes necessary to support his morality." 
This is because "those who think for themselves, who 
understand the true principles of rational action, need 
instead a reason for behaving morally." 29 Since we cannot 
assume (much less enforce) the promise of providence today, 
"a suitably profane substitute," as Stanton urges, is 
clearly necessary. Yet Hedges' exhortations do find 
resonance with the "essence" of Locke's critical theology. 
If one reads Locke's Letter with a sensitivity to the 
nuance and complexity of his religious beliefs, combined 
with an awareness of just how progressive he was for his 
time and place, one is better able to appreciate both the 
difficulty and the value in his attempt to find a balance 
between faith and reason. Thusly considered, the parallel 
with Hedges' statement should become clearer. 
Consider, for example, Locke's attempt to mitigate 
between dogmatism and cynicism, what Kraynak has termed 
Locke's ''moderate skepticism" that allows for consistency 
in belief while maintaining a healthy distrust and 
suspicion of clerics. Locke's "moderate skepticism" he 
29 Steven forde, "Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in Locke,u 
Ameri.can Llourna.I of Po.Iitical Science. Vol.46,No.2 (Apr.,2001), 399. 
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writes, ~is the belief that orthodoxy exists and can be 
discovered, but is difficult to possess with certainty 
because it's fallible and authorities are untrustworthy." 30 
While a surface reading of Locke may rightly be interpreted 
as a relic of the past, a deeper understanding of his 
theology opens up the possibility for a potentially 
universal reading of his prescriptions for religious 
toleration. By showing that orthodoxy does exist and that 
worship is not indifferent, all the while stressing the 
difficulty of achieving absolute certainty in such matters, 
we find a fitting model for the twenty-first century. As 
Kraynak puts it: 
Locke's statement allows readers to believe they are 
orthodox, but tempers the strength of that belief by 
pointing, not to the indifference of worship, but to 
the variety of opinions. This reminds them of human 
fallibility; it suggests that the truth coexists with 
many errors and is difficult to possess with 
certainty. 31 
Locke's critical theology is therefore compatible with 
present-day struggles - struggles we might better term 
'spiritual' or 'existential' rather than explicitly or 
traditionally 'religious.' The Dalai Lama offers a useful 
observation when he writes: "since the majority does not 
practice religion, I am concerned to try to find a way to 
Kraynak, 64. 
Kraynak, 6"1. 
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serve all humanity without appeal to religious faith. " 32 For 
this reason he calls his model a spiritual revolution 
rather than a religious one, concerned less with salvation 
or the eternal realm, and more with the radical 
individualism that separates people from the wider 
community and the responsibilities they have to their 
fellow human beings. To be sure, in the case of the former, 
we do find problems with a literal appropriation of the 
Lockean model. In the case of the latter, however, we see 
in Locke a partner who is willing to criticize greed and 
hypocrisy and urge people to live up to the responsibility 
of their convictions. As he writes at the end of the 
Letter: 
It is not the diversity of opinions, which cannot be 
avoided; but the refusal of toleration to those that 
are of different opinions, which might have been 
granted, that has produced all the bustles and wars, 
that have been in the Christian world on account of 
religion. The heads and leaders of the church, moved 
by avarice and insatiable desire for dominion, making 
use of the immoderate ambition of magistrates, and the 
credulous superstition of the giddy multitude, have 
incensed and animated them against those that dissent 
from themselves, by preaching unto them, contrary to 
the laws of the Gospel, and to the precepts of 
charity, that schematics and heretics are to be outed 
of their possessions, and destroyed. 33 
Locke's unflinching criticism of religious authorities lS a 
tradition that lS sorely lacking from the contemporary 
L:acai Larna, Ibid, 20. 
Lucke, Letter, 163. 
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scene. Theologian Richard Fenn makes this point when he 
criticizes mainstream churches for not condemning religious 
demagogues and their use of apocalyptic rhetoric against 
other traditions: "Unless the churches ... come together on 
this, they will continue to make it legitimate to believe 
in the end as a time when there will be no non-Christians 
or infidels. " 34 
Ironically, Locke's insistence on the truth of the New 
Dispensation and of the validity of the Christian message 
does hold some universal implications. It is not his 
precise prescriptions for the "mutual toleration of 
Christians in their different professions of religion," 35 as 
he writes in the opening lines of the Letter, that is 
important, but rather the example he sets for the 
acceptance of heterodoxy, despite one's convictions, and 
his insistence that inner belief be won through the 
exercise of critical reason. Mitchell speaks to this point 
when he writes on the value of the New Dispensation: 
While a common form of worship within a community 
gives the appearance that the one true God is being 
worshiped, unless inner belief is present among the 
worshipers, outward appearance will be deceptive. It 
is inner belief that gives substance to outward 
worship; without the former, a common form of worship 
is vacuous. Unicity of worship under exterior 
compulsion does not necessarily indicate a worship of 
:,
4 Richard K. Fenn, Dreams of Glory: The Sources of Apocalyptic Terror 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 60. 
Locke, Letter, 126. 
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the one true God. God's truth makes its way into the 
mind of the person whose reason is unconstrained. 
Proper worship can only follow from this. 3 E 
To be sure, Locke's interpretation of the New Dispensation 
is one that applies specifically to the Christian 
tradition, and may not find the same kind of reception 
among other faith traditions (to say nothing of the various 
Christian theologies and denominations). Where Locke is 
most strong, however, and where his legacy is perhaps most 
overlooked in critical scholarship, is in the sincerity of 
his attempt to unite faith and reason, providing assurance 
that the truth does exist, while stressing that the 
fallibility of human beings prevents us from attaining it 
with absolute certainty. In this sense, the old Talmudic 
proverb - "You are not obligated to complete the work, but 
neither are you free to abandon it" - finds a metonymic 
likeness in Locke thinking. From this we might conclude 
that there are certain "strains" or "themes" in Locke's 
moral and political philosophy that can be applied by both 
secular and religious believers in our present day and age. 
In a post-9/11 world, where secular and multi-
religious forces are increasingly coming into conflict with 
one another, theories of toleration that are not sensitive 
Mitchell, Theological F'ou:1dations, 71. 
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to both the sacred and the profane sensibilities of 
humankind will only serve to isolate and antagonize 
whichever side they choose to ignore. By emphasizing the 
importance of the inner persuasion of the mind, combined 
with the difficulty of achieving this end, we find a 
fitting model for all belief systems, be they secular or 
religious. Moreover, if it is understood, as Schleiermacher 
attests, that "the spirit of religion can only be 
understood through itself," 37 then we find a opening for 
positive or intrinsic tolerance, as Gustav Mensching has 
termed it. Positive tolerance, he writes, is the 
"acknowledgement of a foreign religion as a genuine and 
legitimate religious possibility of encounter with the 
sacred." Unlike formal toleration or non-persecution, "this 
type of tolerance is not indifferentism -a tolerance based 
on unconcern- but rather an attitude of utmost sympathy." 38 
If secular and religious individuals can concede to the 
value and validity of a spiritual or existential quest, 
either within or outside of traditional frameworks, and 
recognize that faith without uncertainty is the root source 
of civil or religious conformity, then we might see an 
opportunity to steal some of the fire that has been sparked 
Friedrich Sch1eiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured 
Despisers (New York: C;cunbridqe University Press, 1988), p.285. 
Gustav Hensching, Tolerdn,:_-e ancl Truth in R<c'ligion (The Uni·Jersity of 
Alabama Press: 1971), ll. 
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on the fumes of extremist ideologies. The fundamental 
problems we face today are not as far removed from the 
battlefield of seventeenth-century Europe, as we might 
think. As Locke observed, when the gap between acts of 
faith - "charity, meekness, and goodwill in general towards 
all mankindu - and professed faith - "the antiquity of 
places and names, or of the pomp of their outward 
worship ... of the orthodoxy of their faithu 39 - grows out of 
hand, the greater our delusions become about our own 
prominence in the world. These are not marks of the "true 
churchu but rather "marks of men's striving for power and 
empire over on another,u which lead us inexorably toward 
the fire and the sword. 
cj Locke, L,C>tter, 126. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper I have addressed Locke's moral and 
political theology in the context of seventeenth-century 
religious thought. By tracing a course throughout his early 
intellectual career, from his authoritarian Two Tracts to 
his more liberal "Essay on Toleration,u I have attempted to 
show how the evolution of Locke's theory of toleration 
represents a pattern of political integrity that 
consistently denied such things as the divine right of 
king's or the supremacy of any one "trueu religion. Where 
Locke was to change over time was in his conception of how 
best to regulate matters of ritual and belief (i.e., 
'indifferent things'), eventually arguing for the 
psychological needs of conscience over and against their 
lawful suppression. This change in view was not only a 
pragmatic measure, but came from a deeply held religious 
belief in Christ's fulfillment of the New Dispensation, 
requiring Christians to tolerate people of all faiths as a 
point of principle. With particular attention to the Letter 
Concerning Toleration, I have argued that a theological 
understanding of Locke's theory is imperative not only in 
terms of its historical accuracy, but in terms of its moral 
implications for the present dilemma of religious 
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toleration. Thusly considered, we see in Locke's theory not 
a model to be adapted facsimile for the twenty-first 
century, but rather a valuable example of a wise and 
prodigious thinker whose struggles to unite faith and 
reason still speak to us in the present. 
In his 1992 book Technopoly, cultural critic Neil 
Postman makes the claim that contemporary education must 
become attuned to what he calls the "assent of humanity," a 
belief that humanity's destiny is the discovery of 
knowledge. This assent necessarily seeks to join art and 
science, faith and reason, and is illuminated by the 
unyielding recognition that knowledge of the transcendent 
is not a final destination, but a never-ending labour of 
trail and error on the road to self-awareness. 1 It is what 
Maynard Hutchins once called learning to participate in the 
"Great Conversation," which, as Postman contends, 1s "an 
idea-centered" form of education, and one which "stresses 
history, the scientific mode of thinking, the disciplined 
use of language, a wide-ranging knowledge of the arts and 
religion, and the continuity of the human enterprise." Not 
engaging in this conversation is to erase our collective 
history and turn society into a technocratic wasteland. 
1 NP.il Postman, Technopoly: The Surrencl2r of Culture' to Technoloq'y· (New 
York: forst Vintage Bcoks: 1992), 18'7. 
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Moreover: 
It is to deprive students of a sense of the meaning of 
what we know, and of how we know. To teach about the 
atom without Democritus, to teach about electricity 
without Faraday, to teach about political science 
without Aristotle or Machiavelli, to teach about music 
without Haydn, is to refuse our students access to the 
Great Conversation. It is to deny them knowledge of 
their roots, about which no other social institution 
is at present concerned. For to know about your roots 
is not merely to know where your grandfather came from 
and what he had to endure. It is also to know where 
your ideas come from and why you believe them; to know 
where your moral and aesthetic sensibilities come 
from. 2 
The reader, I am sure, is able to anticipate where this is 
leading. The materialist reading of Locke, which I have 
critiqued throughout this paper, is committing the very 
crime that Postman has rightly condemned by excising a 
fundamental component of the "Great Conversationu that 
seeks toward transcendence and meaning. While the 
materialist may be adept at navigating the diverse 
tributaries of Democritus, Aristotle, or Machiavelli, we 
might ask what they know of Aquinas, Tillich, or Merton, 
and how their theological understanding has shaped the 
modern world? Or are they considered (if they are 
considered at all) merely as a curiosity, or cautionary 
example for their "datedu metaphysics? This problem is what 
Joshua Mitchell had in mind when he writes, quoting 
2 Postman, Technopoly, 18CJ. 
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Nietzsche, "that the History of Political Thought is an 
'atavism of the highest order,'" 3 suggesting that 
philosophers tend to project their own desires in their 
search for "truth" or meaning. Pondering the question of 
how religious interpretations of Locke come about, Mitchell 
wonders whether what is at issue is ''a scholar's sympathy 
toward religion ln general, towards Christianity in 
particular, and toward the idea that modern secular 
politics stands on its own as a coherent whole, without the 
need of religious foundations." 4 Without venturing into a 
sociology of percentages, it is safe to conclude that there 
exists in Locke scholarship (and in scholarship in general) 
a fundamental disconnect between the past and the present, 
where religious sensibilities are often seen as a bygone 
relic with nothing to say our current situation. This 
disconnect is seen most notably in the gap between 
knowledge and values that has come about on the heels of 
the rise in science and the decline in religion as a source 
of knowledge about our natural world. What a theological 
reading can add to the conversation (or in this case, to 
Locke scholarship) is a critical exploration of the 
religious foundations of liberal philosophy, so that we are 
3 Joshua Mitchell, a review of The Biblical Politics of .~hn Locke by 
Kim Ian P"lrker, i1rs Disputandi Vol. ") (2007), l. 
1 Mitchell, Ibid, l. 
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better able to understand how it first came into being, why 
it was so influential, and how we might modify and expand 
upon it in a way that is sensitive to the non-rational, 
meaning-centred enterprise that theology and religious 
studies seek to offer. 
In examining some of the variables that contributed to 
the evolution of Locke's theory on toleration, such as his 
experiences abroad, his political alliances, and his deeply 
held religious beliefs, it should be clear to any fair-
minded reader that his was anything but a covert atheism, 
as the Straussian's have maintained. Much less was he a 
thinker who was insincere about the need for a moral 
foundation amidst the plurality of belief and the 
innovations of scientific rationalism. As Paul Sigmund has 
noted, Locke was a man who read "more books on medicine and 
science than on any other subject."5 And yet this did not 
seem to affect his beliefs, but rather forced him to 
struggle with and modify his thinking as new developments, 
ideas, and innovations came to pass. Indeed, Locke's final 
work, A Paraphrase and Notes on Paul's Epistles (1706), 
shows that he was concerned with theological questions 
right up until the time of his death. 
If Locke's theory of toleration is to have any 
s Si']mund, Selected Political Writi.nc;s, xiii. 
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relevance for our modern world, scholars must find a way 
pacify the ingrained religious bias of many political 
scientists (among others), to show why it is important to 
take his theology seriously, and to show how this can be 
done so that some of his more dated assumptions are 
understood as a product of their time. Considered thusly, 
we find ln Locke a thinker who differed dramatically from 
most of his contemporaries, forcing medieval notions of 
theology, such as a belief in the divine right of king's 
and the natural depravity of humankind, to step into the 
age of reason through his condemnation of such practices 
and insistence on the separation of church and state. 
Likewise, we find in Locke a thinker who risked not only 
his position in society, but his very life to denounce such 
widely held beliefs as innatism and religious enthusiasm 
(the equivalent of modern-day "fundamentalism") and to find 
a balance between the vagaries of faith and reason, while 
stressing the need for a dialectic of tradition and 
modernity that seeks to bring the former into the latter. 
It is in this sense, most strikingly, that Locke's 
hermeneutic speaks to us in the present, which we ignore at 
our own peril. 
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